Dr. Thaung Htun, Representative of the NCGUB for UN Affairs
Address at the Asian Society
November 23, 1998

When I was invited by the Asian Society to talk on the topic of sex, drugs and politics in Burma, it brought to mind a public health lecture I heard during my days as a medical student. It was a lecture given by Dr. Aung Khin Sint, an elected MP and cent

ral committee member of the National League for Democracy, who has been detained by the military regime. The lecture was actually an analysis of the epidemiology of contagious diseases such as tuberculosis, viral/amoebic hepatitis, cholera, dysentery, di

arrhea, and plague.

Various factors that contribute to the widespread occurrence of such savage diseases include, poor sanitation, lack of safe water, poor personnel hygiene, malnutrition and the lack of health education resulting from the main underlying factor, poverty.

Dr. Aung Khin Sint asked the class what they believed was the cause of the extreme level of poverty and requested that we further consider this question. The whole class knew exactly the point he was making. The deprivation of freedom of expression unde

r the military regime didn't allow us to even discuss the root cause of poverty. As you are aware, the subject of public health is the union of medicine and politics.

What I want to say is that it is not enough to approach health problems purely from the medical point of view. An accountable and transparent government that has the political commitment to give priority to the welfare of the people is a major factor for

resolving the health problems people in Burma are facing today.

The topic of the today's workshop itself expresses the interconnection between the issues of HIV/AIDS, narcotics trade and political status in Burma that has been hindering the process of transforming into an open society.

As previous speakers have adequately presented the dimension of the problem in detail, I would like to highlight the view of the Burmese democracy movement on HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking and policy recommendations.

A report published by the WHO indicates that those effected by HIV/AIDS are from a relatively young and economically productive age group of twenty to forty year old people. Given the fact that there is a very long period between HIV exposure and infecti

on, between 5 to 12 years, to the manifestation of AIDS, the statistics we have access to today, regardless of their reliability, is just the tip of the iceberg. Unless this epidemic can be controlled within few years, it will become a disastrous health

crisis that will extract huge resources, destroy the productive capacity of the people and end with total economic collapse. This is not to deny that the manifestations of such a crisis are emerging today.

If the present HIV/AIDS crisis continues like this, when democracy comes to Burma, the country will already be devastated. In the case of Burma, all forms of transmission of HIV/AIDS are involved. An effective HIV control program must include condom prom

otion and distribution, improved detection and management of sexually transmitted diseases, access to clean syringes and needles for intravenous drugs users, rigorous screening of blood and blood products, widespread implementation of universal precautio

ns in medical settings, broad public education campaigns and targeted interventions for those at highest risk. However, a strategy for HIV/AIDS control won't be comprehensive if we do not address the issues of the status of women, the economics of the na

rcotics trade and the levels of social tolerance and political repression in a society.

Therefore, we cannot agree with the concept of de-politicization of HIV advocated by some donor agencies. In Burma, the problem is not simply the lack of international support or financial resources but it is a problem of an illegal ruling regime that is

autocratic and only accountable to itself. We are dealing with a military dictatorship that has no political will to publicly acknowledge the existence of the HIV crisis in Burma and whose main strategic policy is to control the political, economic and

social lives of the citizens in order to secure its holding onto power.

Under the present circumstances key factors essential for effective public health interventions, access to education, freedom of information, expression and thought and the empowerment of women, are severely limited.

It is very obvious that prevention is the most effective way for a Least Developing Country like Burma that is unlikely to obtain all effective HIV vaccines or have enough resources for curative treatment. Partnership between international NGOs, communi

ty based peoples' organizations and policy makers should be the main aim in our fight against HIV/AIDS. Participation of the civilian population in public health intervention should be encouraged and an independent role of international NGOs should be guaranteed.

The Burmese democracy movement holds the HIV/AIDS issue as an urgent priority in national health agendas. Elected members of parliament, representatives of the ethnic organizations and pro-democracy groups explored the policy options dealing with this

issue at a policy development forum held by the support of SAIN in Thailand three years ago.

That meeting unanimously set the following policy recommendations:

(1) The people of Burma should have the right to fully and freely participate in the National HIV/AIDS control program.

(2) Any donor agency or international NGO considering involvement with HIV/AIDS in Burma should initiate any such collaboration, at a minimum, in consultation with the elected leaders and ethnic leaders in and/or out of the country, and optimally, in a f

ull collaborative partnership.

(3) A commitment on the part of the donors and on the part of the SPDC to an open accounting of the use of funds and resources. Such accounting should be made to a neutral international body, and would include clauses for the cessation of aid if resource

s were not reaching the target populations.

(4) An agreement by all parties involved in HIV prevention, care and research, to fully abide by the Geneva accords on the rights of the research subjects. Again, such agreements would include mechanisms of observation and mandatory cessation of funds if

rights violations were identified.

(5) The participation of people with AIDS, and of people from groups at risk (sex workers, drugs addicts and others) in the design and implementation of HIV programs. These would include assurances of their protection and again, cessation of such project

s if the rights of community members were violated.

I believe cross border intervention is currently the most effective method of treating this dilemma whilst it is impossible to have community based peoples' organizations and international NGOs operating freely inside Burma. Mining and fishing communitie

s inside Burma where HIV prevalence is high require immediate attention. Other high-risk groups are Burmese migrant workers in Thailand who are working in the sex industry, fishing industries, factories and plantations. HIV education, condom promotion an

d distribution of needles and syringes for intravenous drug users and empowerment of women are key components the HIV/AIDS campaign.

Education can be done in the form of leaflets, posters and videotapes as well as radio programs through the Democratic Voice of Burma, Radio Free Asia and Voice of America. I believe Burmese activists in Thailand in partnership with international NGOs an

d Thai NGOs can launch such a campaign. At the same time, we are going to encourage students and women inside Burma to form self-help groups in order to implement a HIV campaign. Under the present circumstances, activities inside Burma can only be small

scale and informal.

As I mentioned earlier, we cannot neglect the problem of the narcotics trade and heroin addicts when we deal with HIV/AIDS issue. Burma is a major opium grower, accounting for more than 60% of the world's opium production. During the Special Session of t

he United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) June 8-10, the UNDP sought international assistance to implement a 10-year drug eradication plan in Burma. The ambitious plan, estimated to cost US$ 250 million, primarily aims focus on an alternative dev

elopment program for opium growers, including crop substitution, as a solution to the decades-long problem. The representative of the Burmese military junta at the UN drugs summit, citing the seizure of 1401 kilos of heroin and 7884 kilos of opium gum du

ring 1997, claimed that the junta was making serious efforts to eradicate drugs and called on the donor community to commit more funds for the alternative development projects in areas under illicit crops.

We are keen to see a coordinated international effort to eradicate drugs. And, as Burmese, we feel responsible for the destruction of millions of young lives in United States by opium and heroin originating in Burma. But, we are really skeptical about t

he seriousness of the regime, which is well known for its collaboration with drug traffickers. The total amount of opium/heroin seized last year was less than one percent of Burma's estimated output, which is about 2,365 metric tons opium gum in 1997.

The fact is the Burmese military regime is the problem, and not the solution.

Even though it is difficult to provide hard evidence that the military regime is involved in the drug trade at the institutional level, it is undeniably responsible for providing immunity to major drug traffickers and for the laundering of drug money. La

st year's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the US State Department also confirmed that officials, particularly army personnel posted in outlying areas, are involved in the drug business. Since 1989, the regime has given armed ethnic gro

ups involved in the drug trade limited autonomy, including the right to continue their drug business without any official intervention. They have done this in exchange for cease-fire and development assistance. Since then, the annual opium production in

Burma has tripled from 800 metric tons before 1988 to an average of 2,400 metric tons in the 1990s.

In addition, drug barons are officially required to deposit money in State-owned banks if they pay 25% of that deposited amount as tax. Billions of dollars worth of drug money has been laundered in the past ten years. Drug lords have since established bu

sinesses in Rangoon and poured drug money into official businesses. These businesses range from import and export, hotel construction and real estate development to infrastructure development.

Going against standard international legal principles, which call for the punishment of drug traffickers and criminals, the regime has refused to extradite the notorious drug lord, Khun Sa, who carries a $2 million US reward on his head. Instead, Khun

Sa was given a $250 million concession to construct and operate a six-lane expressway from Rangoon to Mandalay. The Burmese military regime has also provided security for him even though he remains involved in the drug trade.

Another drug baron Lo Hsing Han acts as the adviser on ethnic affairs to Khin Nyunt, Secretary (1) of the ruling council and chief of military intelligence chief. Lo was also awarded the contract for the construction and development of Rangoon seaport.

The focus of the UNDCP's plan in the 'drug war' is on the cultivators of the crop, the raw material (opium), on the one hand, and addicts and petty pushers, on the other. The plan, which ignores big financiers and money laundering, is misdirected. It de

als with the symptoms rather than the root causes, which are:

. extreme rural poverty induced by the decades long conflict resulting from the military's refusal to respect equality, autonomy and self-determination of non-Burman ethnic nationalities, and

. bad governance where politics and government serve only the top echelons and repress the majority.

Under the present circumstances, we do not believe the UNDCP plan will achieve the stated drug eradication objectives. If the plan is to succeed, we need a transparent and accountable government that has the confidence of the people and that would guara

ntee the rule of law. Secondly, we need to build up the confidence of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities in the opium-growing areas, a vital requisite for ensuring full cooperation by the local populace in drug eradication efforts.

The current cease-fire arrangement by the regime failed to address the question of rights for the non-Burman ethnic nationalities. Armed ethnic forces still maintain huge armies. For example, United Wa State Army (UWSA) alone has a 20,000-strong army wh

ich is being maintained with the income from the drug trade. The demobilization of the irregular ethnic armed forces will never take place without solving the question of rights for minorities.

The other reason that the comprehensive alternative development plan will not succeed is because it is not an integral part of a rational, long-term national economic and development plan. The rapidly deteriorating state of Burma's national economy is a

n indication of poor performance and mismanagement by the generals who do not have the capability to cope with the economic crisis.

The drug problem in Burma is a complex political-economic issue and cannot simply be resolved by the development approach alone. The inherent political problem must be addressed first. The restoration of peace and national reconciliation and the establi

shment of a democratic form of governance are utmost important prerequisites for the success of drug eradication. The alternative development plan in the opium growing areas can be carried out once that is done.

END

Burma UN Service Office

777 UN Plaza, 6th Floor

New York,NY,10017

U.S.A