Jane's Intelligence Review

March 1, 1998

SECTION: ASIA; Vol. 10; No. 3; Pg. 35

LENGTH: 6399 words

HEADLINE: SIGINT strengths form a vital part of Burma's military muscle

BYLINE: Desmond Ball

HIGHLIGHT: Burma's junta is forming what may soon become Southeast Asia'slargest army. Desmond Ball takes a comprehensive look at how Rangoonhas built signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities to match it.

BODY:

Burma (Myanmar) is a country of ironies and contradictions,

manifested in extraordinary tragedy. In the 1930s it was

economically one of the most successful countries in Asia; it is now

one of the poorest. Politically, a parliamentary democracy was

established when Burma obtained independence from Britain in 1948;

but Burma now has the most oppressive military dictatorship in Asia

(called the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC, from

September 1988 to November 1997, and thence the State Peace and

Development Council, or SPDC). Despite the poverty and limited

budgetary resources, the SLORC embarked on a military build-up which

will soon result in the Burmese armed forces (Tatmadaw) being not

only the largest in Southeast Asia but also less equipment-poor than

it has traditionally been. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and

electronic warfare (EW) capabilities have been a major feature of

the Tatmadaw's modernisation programme.

Beginnings

For the first three decades after Burma achieved independence in

1948, its SIGINT capabilities remained modest and its SIGINT

operations rudimentary. The British Military Mission that remained

in Burma for another six years provided the Tatmadaw with signals

equipment and training. The large radio stations at Mingaladon and

Hmawbi were used to intercept long-distance communications, while

army signals units were trained in tactical intercept activities.

In the 1960s and 1970s, a range of signals interception and

direction-finding (DF) systems were acquired from the UK, the USA

and West Germany (such as four-pole Adcock antennas and AN/PRD-1 DF

systems), but these were of 1940s vintage. By the 1980s, this

equipment was obsolete.

During this long period, Burmese SIGINT operations were almost

entirely concerned with monitoring the radio traffic of the various

insurgency groups, which was done at both the command and

operational levels. For example, a Signals Security Battalion was

established at Mingaladon which also outposted personnel to the

Regional Commands. Tactical-level intercepts were also obtained by

army signals units during counter-insurgency campaigns.

Some foreign signals intelligence operations were also organised.

These involved monitoring the radio traffic of China, India and

Thailand, especially radio traffic involving insurgent groups in the

border areas. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the Burmese Army

intercepted Chinese signals traffic, albeit communications with

Communist Party of Burma (CPB) posts in northern Burma. The Tatmadaw

also had the basic capabilities for monitoring short-wave or high

frequency (HF) radio broadcasts, whether beamed into Burma from

outside or broadcast from clandestine sites within Burma itself.

Burma's SIGINT capabilities were demonstrated at the beginning of

the 1970s when, in October-December 1970, the Tatmadaw attempted to

capture former prime minister U Nu, who was then leading rebel

forces in western Burma and transmitting regular radio broadcasts

criticising the military dictatorship under General Ne Win in

Rangoon. The Tatmadaw's radio monitoring and DF equipment was fairly

good; indeed, in mid-December U Nu was nearly captured when it

located his position through his radio broadcasts. However, he had

already been transmitting for nearly two months before he was

located, and even then he and his radio operators evaded capture.

By 1988, the Tatmadaw had effectively contained the ethnic

insurgents. There were still large units from several groups

undefeated, but the integrity of the Union of Burma was no longer a

military issue. However, the regime had been increasingly unable to

deal with the pro-democracy movement and other expressions of

discontent in Rangoon and other major cities.

The SLORC

In September 1988, after six months of mounting protests and

pro-democracy demonstrations in Rangoon in which thousands of

demonstrators were killed, the armed forces regained direct control

of the country. The establishment of the SLORC was announced on 18

September by General Saw Maung, Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw.

On 19 September the SLORC directed the massacre of hundreds of

people in Rangoon and dissolved the existing organs of state power;

the next day it set up its own government. Its essential mission was

to eliminate all forms of internal dissent or rebellion.

The SLORC consisted of 21 Tatmadaw officers. The chairman (General

Saw Maung from September 1988 to April 1992 and thence General Than

Shwe) was concurrently prime minister, defence minister and

commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw. The SLORC vice chairman served

also as deputy commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw and army

commander-in-chief. The secretary of the SLORC was Lieutenant

General Khin Nyunt, who was also head of the Office of Strategic

Studies (OSS) and director of the Directorate of Defence Services

Intelligence (DDSI). A dozen of the latter's members serve as

ministers in charge of the various government departments. The SLORC

Security and Management Committee served as a secretariat, providing

oversight of and general policy direction to the country's

intelligence apparatus.

Soon after it assumed power, the SLORC embarked on an ambitious

programme to expand and modernise the Tatmadaw. By 1996 the

Tatmadaw's total strength had reached about 321,000 - nearly double

that of 1988 - and the army now has 300,000 personnel organised into

245 infantry battalions and 13 artillery, armoured and anti-aircraft

artillery battalions. Until 1988, the procurement of arms from

abroad had been very modest, but the SLORC soon arranged for

substantial weapon supplies from China as well as acquisitions from

Yugoslavia, Poland, Russia and Singapore.

The SLORC also dramatically enlarged the Tatmadaw's intelligence

capabilities. For example, the number of Military Intelligence

detachments doubled from 10-12 before 1988 to 23 in mid-1992. New

SIGINT facilities have been established and an extensive array of

signals interception and DF systems, ocean/maritime surveillance

systems and EW systems have been acquired. These provided the SLORC

with a comprehensive ability to intercept the radio traffic of

ethnic groups in the border areas as well as monitor

telecommunications in Rangoon. The SLORC also obtained, for the

first time, the ability to collect significant foreign signals

intelligence, jam foreign signals and conduct limited EW operations.

The SPDC

On 15 November 1997 the SLORC announced that it had reorganised

itself and was now titled the State Peace and Development Council.

It is now a slightly smaller council, consisting of 19 Tatmadaw

officers - the chairman and commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw

(Senior General Than Shwe), the vice chairman and commander-in-chief

of the army (General Maung Aye), three secretaries (Lieutenant

Generals Khin Nyunt, Tin Oo and Win Myint), the commander-in-chief

of the navy (Commodore Nyunt Thein), the commander-in-chief of the

air force (Brigadier General Kyaw Than) and the commanders of the 12

Regional Military Commands.

A 40-member Cabinet was created, consisting mainly of military

officers from the Regional Military Commands and the Light Infantry

Divisions (LIDs). Unlike the SLORC, more than a dozen members of

which doubled as cabinet ministers, only the SPDC's chairman, Senior

General Than Shwe, remains concurrently a minister. A new Ministry

of Military Affairs was established, headed by Lieutenant General

Tin Hla, a long-time Khin Nyunt loyalist and former commander of the

22nd LID. A 14-member Advisory Board was created, consisting mainly

of the displaced members of the SLORC, but it is unlikely to be

active.

The reorganisation was an adroit and effective move to both

invigorate and institutionalise the military junta. The more corrupt

members of the SLORC and the Cabinet were retired. The officers in

the SPDC and the new Cabinet are a younger generation, perhaps more

able to address Burma's severe economic problems and with a more

acceptable international image. However, the Tatmadaw has

effectively given itself a permanent role in the country's

government, with power being consolidated by the Rangoon-based

members of the junta.

The High Command

The commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw, a five-star post (since May

1990), is concurrently also the chairman of the SPDC, the prime

minister and the defence minister. Since May 1989, each Service has

had its own commander-in-chief and chief of staff. The

commander-in-chief of the army, a four-star post, also serves as

deputy chairman of the SPDC and deputy commander-in-chief of the

armed forces. The commanders-in-chief of the navy and air force hold

three-star ranks, while the three service chiefs of staff are

two-star posts.

The High Command is located in the War Office (or Ministry of

Defence), which occupies a large compound stretching from Signal

Pagoda Road across to Kaba Aye Pagoda Road in central Rangoon. Also

located in the War Office are the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS),

the commander of No 1 Special Operations Bureau and several other

departments, including the General Staff (or G) Department, under

which are both the DDSI and the Signals Directorate.

The OSS was established in the early 1990s. It was reportedly set up

to provide a capacity for the SLORC to monitor security developments

in the Asia-Pacific region and for it to engage in regional security

dialogue; however, it also has a command function (probably the

official justification for Khin Nyunt's promotion to four-star rank

in 1994) with respect to internal security operations, including

close monitoring of the activities of dissidents and opposition

politicians such as Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for

Democracy (NLD).

Operational command in the field is exercised through a framework of

12 regional commands and 10 mobile LIDs. The 12 regional commands

are: Rangoon Command, Southern Command (Pegu and Magwe Divisions),

Southeastern Command (Mon and Karen States, and Tenasserim

Division), Coastal Command (Mergui), Southwestern Command (Irrawaddy

Division), Central Command (Mandalay Division), Western Command

(Arakan and Chin States), Eastern Command (southern Shan State),

Northeastern Command (northern Shan State), Northwestern Command

(Sagaing Division), Triangle Command (Kentung) and Northern Command

(Kachin State). The regional commanders (two-star posts) have at

their disposal the regional garrison infantry battalions, which are

managed through between two and four tactical operations commands

(TOCs). In 1996 11 military operation commands (MOCs) were also

established. Two of these are in each of the Eastern, Southeastern

and Western commands; there are none in the Southern, Triangle,

Coastal and Southwestern commands and one in each of the other five

regional commands. These are subordinate to the regional commands

and use many of their facilities. In addition, there are three

quasi-autonomous regional operation commands (ROCs), based in the

Northern, Triangle and Eastern commands. The 10 LIDs are under the

formal command of the minister of defence, with operational control

being passed to regional commanders as circumstances require. Each

of the regional commands, TOCs, ROCs, MOCs and LIDs has

intelligence, signals and SIGINT elements. At the battalion level,

each HQ company has a security platoon, which includes signals and

intelligence sections.

The intelligence and security establishment

The National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) is formally the country's

highest intelligence organ. Reporting directly to the SPDC, it is a

small body responsible for broad policy directions along with

oversight and co-ordination of the activities of the country's

various other intelligence agencies. The director of the DDSI, Khin

Nyunt, serves as director general of the NIB and most of its staff

are provided by the DDSI.

Outside the Tatmadaw, the largest intelligence agencies - the

Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the Special Investigations

Department (SID, often referred to as Special Branch II or SB II)

and the Bureau of Special Investigations (BSI) - are formally under

the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The CID is responsible for investigating common criminal offences,

but it also appears to deal with political suspects. The SID is

responsible for political intelligence and counter-intelligence

activities such as investigating possible subversion, treason or

other anti-government activities.

The BSI was originally organised in 1951 by U Nu as the People's

Property Protection Police, with responsibility for investigating

corruption among political leaders and government employees;

although it remains responsible for investigating corruption and

other 'economic crimes', since the 1960s it has been engaged mostly

in investigating possible threats to the regime.

The DDSI

The DDSI is the most powerful intelligence and security organ in

Burma. All of the other agencies are firmly under its control.

The ascendance of the DDSI since 1984 has been a function of its

director, Khin Nyunt, who also serves as secretary of the SPDC,

commander of the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) and director

general of the NIB. He is dedicated, energetic, intelligent and

capable of extreme ruthlessness and brutality.

The DDSI is managed by a committee of two dozen Tatmadaw officers,

most of whom are not very senior (ie, captains, majors and

lieutenant colonels). Its HQ is in Kone Myint Thaya, Mayangon

township, in north Rangoon near Mingaladon airport, but Khin Nyunt

also maintains an office in the Ministry of Defence compound on

Signal Pagoda Road in central Rangoon.

The activities of the DDSI are very wide-ranging. Its principal task

had originally been to manage military intelligence operations,

particularly with respect to the armed insurgent groups. In the

1980s, it became much more concerned with the investigation and

suppression of political dissent and of other activities seen as

posing a threat to state security. All intelligence sources and

means are employed - from agents and other human intelligence

(HUMINT) to SIGINT and other technical collection devices - to

gather information about the structure, membership and methods of

insurgent and subversive groups, including the Communist Party, the

insurgent armies, opposition political parties and dissident student

movements. Personal dossiers are maintained on known and suspected

dissidents in Burma, members of the diplomatic community and even

critics of the regime who live abroad. The DDSI also administers

more than a dozen detention and interrogation centres across the

country, some of which have become notorious for torture and

killing.

The DDSI directs the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), which is

the largest intelligence organisation in Burma. The DDSI/ MIS field

organisation consists of Military Intelligence detachments, of which

there were 10-12 before 1988, 17 in 1989 and 23 in mid-1992 -

including three special units for surveillance of army, navy and air

force personnel and 20 numbered detachments spread throughout the

country. For example, MI 6 is located with the DDSI HQ near the

Mingaladon airport; MI 7, MI 14 and MI 12 are also based in Rangoon;

MI 9 is in Lashio, near the Chinese border in northeast Burma; MI 4

is in Bassein; MI 5 is in Hpa-an in Kayin (Karen) State; MI 8 is in

Myitkyina; and MI 1 and MI 16 are in Mandalay.

The SIGINT organisation

Organisationally, Burma's SIGINT effort is the responsibility of the

Directorate of Signals, which, like the DDSI, comes under the

General Staff (or G) Department in the Ministry of Defence. The

processing and analysis of foreign SIGINT is the responsibility of

specialist units in the Ministry, with intercepts provided by the

large Tatmadaw communications and DF stations at Mingaladon and

Hmawbi.

The Signals Security Battalion based at Mingaladon is responsible

for the management and co-ordination of operational-level SIGINT

activities. Each of the regional commands has a SIGINT facility,

equipped with interception and DF systems, which operates under the

direction of an officer outposted from the Signal Security Battalion

at Mingaladon. Such officers are also posted to each of the 10 LIDs.

In addition, the air force reportedly maintains both 'radar

regiments' and 'electronic battalions', both of which probably have

a SIGINT role. Air force personnel serve not only at major

airfields, such as Mingaladon, Hmawbi and Myitkyina, but also at

strategic sites around the country's periphery, such as Kutkai and

Loi Mwe. The radar and electronic activities at these places are

concerned mainly with air traffic control and early warning, but

they probably also serve as electronic listening posts for the

intelligence services. In addition, the air force has a number of

small detachments equipped with radio interception and DF equipment;

these operate from forward positions and provide tactical

intelligence about insurgent chains of command and unit locations

for air attack.

The Burmese navy also maintains a SIGINT capability. Until the early

1990s, this was very rudimentary, based on the communications and

radar receiving equipment aboard its larger ships and at its major

shore stations (including Great Coco Island). In the early 1990s,

however, ocean surveillance facilities involving SIGINT and HF DF

capabilities were reportedly built (with Chinese assistance) on

Great Coco Island and other sites along Burma's coastline. Some of

the ships acquired since 1991, such as the Yan Sit Aung (or Hainan)

class ocean patrol vessels, have fairly sophisticated signal

interception capabilities.

Burma's SIGINT capabilities

Since 1988-89, Burma's SIGINT capabilities have been dramatically

enhanced. An extensive array of SIGINT equipment has been acquired,

mostly from China, but also evidently from Singapore and Israel. The

new capabilities include ground stations for collection of foreign

SIGINT as well as for ocean surveillance, mobile SIGINT facilities,

tactical SIGINT systems for military operations, EW systems,

capabilities for monitoring microwave telecommunications (carrying

telephone and facsimile traffic) in Rangoon and a limited capability

to jam HF radio broadcasts.

Most of these capabilities have been provided by China, initially as

part of the defence co-operation agreements reached between Burma

and China in 1989-90. These included, most importantly, Chinese

assistance with the construction in 1992-93 of a large SIGINT

station on Great Coco Island north of the Andaman Islands and of

smaller maritime surveillance facilities at several sites along

Burma's coastline such as Ramree Island, south of Sittwe (Akyab) off

the coast of Arakan state; Hainggyi Island at the mouth of the

Bassein River in the Irrawaddy delta; Monkey Point in Rangoon; and

Zadetkyi Kyun, an island off Burma's southernmost point. China also

provided the Burmese navy and air force with EW equipment and the

army with tactical radio intercept systems for counter-insurgency

operations. Beijing was probably also responsible for the HF radio

broadcast jamming capability acquired by Burma in 1995.

At the end of 1996, Burma and China signed a military co-operation

agreement which included provisions for intelligence exchanges

between Beijing and Rangoon, as well as for Chinese training of

Burmese air force and navy officers in SIGINT activities, including

'in coastal areas'.

Singapore's assistance to the SLORC's SIGINT effort has been much

less extensive than that of China, but it has evidently included

some sophisticated capabilities. For example, Singapore is

reportedly training Burmese military personnel in the use of modern

information technology systems and other equipment being provided to

the Tatmadaw by Singaporean companies. It is likely that Singapore

has provided Burma with various sorts of electronic surveillance

systems, telecommunications monitoring equipment, radio intercept

systems and some EW equipment.

Monitoring the insurgents

From the outbreak of the civil war in 1949 until the SLORC's defence

modernisation programme in the early 1990s, Burma's SIGINT

operations were almost entirely concerned with monitoring the radio

traffic of the numerous insurgency groups, including the various

ethnic groups with several dozen political and military

organisations: the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and several other

Communist factions; the Nationalist Chinese, or Kuomintang (KMT),

who had retreated into northern Burma from Yunnan in 1950 after the

Communist victory in China; and from the 1960s the armed groups

involved in the opium trade in northern Burma such as Khun Sa's Shan

United Army (SUA). By March 1949, the various ethnic insurgents

effectively controlled most of Burma; by the 1970s, the Burmese army

had forced them back to strongholds in the mountainous border areas.

Some of the insurgent groups were very large; indeed, for some years

in the early 1950s a couple of them had armed forces as large as the

Burmese army itself. The largest groups were the Karen National

Defence Organisation (KNDO), the armed wing of the Karen National

Union (KNU), which had a strength of 10,000-12,000 in the early

1950s; the CPB, which had 15,000-18,000 members in 1950 and about

23,000 in the late 1970s; the Shan State Army (SSA)/Shan State

Progress Party (SSPP), which had an armed strength in its heyday in

the 1970s of 5,000-6,000; the Kachin Independence Organisation

(KIO)/Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which had 6,000-7,000 troops

in the early 1990s; Khun Sa's SUA/Mong Tai Army (MTA), which reached

nearly 20,000 in the early 1990s; and the United Wa State Army

(UWSA), which has 10,000-15,000 troops.

These groups maintained a variety of political/administrative

centres, command posts and military HQs, sometimes involving dozens

of staff, which often had to be relocated in response to Tatmadaw

offensives. Several groups maintained broadcasting facilities for

beaming news bulletins to field units as well as propaganda. Radio

links were also maintained between the HQs of the various rebel

armies and their respective military formations (ie, brigades and

battalions). Field communications involved whatever signals

equipment was available, including British Army wireless sets from

the Second World War, signals equipment captured from the Burmese

army and walkie-talkies and CB radios bought in Thailand.

For most of the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, the signals

equipment and practices used by the principal insurgent

organisations were just as good as those of the Tatmadaw. Several

organisations have employed encryption techniques, of varying

degrees of sophistication, for strategic communications as well as

operational signals. Some of the insurgents' encryption systems were

evidently superior to Burmese cryptanalytical capabilities, such as

the Chinese-devised codes which were used by the CPB for

'battlefield instructions' in the late 1960s. By the early 1990s,

however, the beleaguered insurgents had poorer encryption techniques

and practices, especially with respect to field communications.

The SLORC had also acquired more advanced signals interception and

DF equipment. The air force, for example, has acquired a DF

capability for directing air strikes against insurgent positions. In

January-February 1995, when the Tatmadaw captured Manerplaw and

Kawmura, the last bastions of the insurgent organisations, its radio

monitoring service was able to provide a comprehensive and detailed

picture of insurgent decisions and activities.

By 1997, the Tatmadaw had also acquired a vehicular SIGINT

capability for forward operations in remote areas. In April 1997,

for example, a six-wheeled SIGINT truck was stationed at Loi Htwe, a

1,800 m mountain near the Thai border, some 110 km north of Chiang

Mai. The equipment was made in China and the intelligence it

collects is reportedly shared with the Chinese. It is likely that

this particular SIGINT vehicle is involved in monitoring the

communications of the UWSA, whose main area of operations lies along

the Yunnan frontier but which also has smaller bases along the

Thai-Burmese border. The UWSA is involved in arms and drug smuggling

in the China-Burma-Thailand area.

Foreign SIGINT

Burma's capabilities for foreign SIGINT collection and processing,

which had existed only in the most rudimentary form of signals

monitoring from the 1950s to the 1980s, have been significantly

enhanced over the past decade.

Burma now has at least three large stations concerned with foreign

SIGINT collection. These are the Tatmadaw's long-standing

communications and DF stations at Mingaladon and Hmawbi and the

station built by the Chinese on Great Coco Island in 1992. The

Defence Forces Broadcasting Unit at Taunggyi in Shan State evidently

also has foreign HF radio monitoring (and jamming) capabilities.

Smaller SIGINT stations have also been established at various points

around the country's border. The principal targets of Burma's

foreign SIGINT activities have been China, India, Bangladesh and

Thailand.

In the 1960s and the 1970s, the Tatmadaw monitored communications

between China and the CPB HQs in northern Burma (although it was

evidently unable to break the Chinese codes).

It seems that the capabilities of the SIGINT station on Great Coco

Island were designed, at least in part, to monitor Indian signals,

such as those to and from the Indian base at Port Blair and those

associated with Indian ballistic missile test launches over the Bay

of Bengal.

The Tatmadaw has engaged in extensive monitoring of communications

in Thailand. It has intercepted Thai Government broadcasts as well

as Thai armed forces radio traffic, the latter mostly in connection

with insurgency activities along the Burma-Thailand border. In

particular, Tatmadaw SIGINT units regularly monitor Thai army radio

traffic during Tatmadaw counter-insurgency operations in border

areas, especially where cross-border operations are involved or when

major movements of Thai forces are generated. The Tatmadaw also

monitors the communications of insurgent groups using transmission

facilities in northwest Thailand, as many of them have done since

the 1970s. It is likely that the mobile SIGINT facility stationed at

Loi Htwe in early 1997 is (inter alia) used for this purpose.

The maritime surveillance systems and other elements of Burma's

defence modernisation programme have also provided capabilities for

monitoring radio and electronic signals of various sorts and

nationalities. The HF DF systems, of course, monitor naval and other

maritime HF radio traffic within range regardless of the nationality

of the transmitter. Some of the navy's new ELINT/EW systems can be

used to collect electronic order of battle (EOB) intelligence about

foreign radar systems operating within particular frequency bands

and some can be programmed with data about hundreds of radar modes,

enabling the identification of threats from numerous (selected)

foreign sources.

Maritime surveillance

Maritime surveillance capabilities, including various sorts of

SIGINT systems as well as other technical collection systems (such

as coastal radars), have been a major feature of Burma's defence

modernisation since 1988-89.

Coastal surveillance and fisheries protection had been growing

issues since the 1960s. Burma has a 2,000 km coastline with numerous

coves and islands. It claims a territorial sea of 12 nm and an

exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nm, amounting to some 148,000

km2. The water, islands and inlets have been used for fish poaching,

seaborne smuggling, the movement of insurgent troops and supplies

and pirate activity. Serious economic and security concerns

notwithstanding, however, Burma could do little about these matters.

The physical dimensions of the problems were large; Burma was unable

to indigenously develop technically sophisticated capabilities and

external suppliers were unavailable.

The SIGINT and coastal surveillance facilities built by Chinese

technicians on Great Coco Island and along Burma's coastline in

1992-93 provided Burma with its first fairly comprehensive picture

of maritime activity across its extensive waters. The SIGINT station

at Great Coco Island is undoubtedly capable of monitoring naval and

air movements across a large expanse of the northeastern Indian

Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, while the sites at Ramree Island,

Hainggy Island, Monkey Point and Zadetkyi Kyun monitor more local

traffic along Burma's coastline as well as movements through the

northern access to the Straits of Malacca. Both HF and VHF DF

operations are maintained.

In addition to these shore-based facilities, important electronic

surveillance capabilities have also been acquired as part of the

modernisation of the navy's surface combatant force. In particular,

some of the navy's new EW systems can collect ELINT over

considerable ranges.

Monitoring telecommunications

Modern telecommunications were introduced into Burma in 1979 when a

satellite communications (SATCOM) ground station was commissioned in

Thanlyin (Syriam) across the Bago River from Rangoon and microwave

systems were installed in Rangoon and Mandalay. Since 1989, the

telecommunications system has been extensively upgraded with

additional SATCOM ground stations, microwave connections and digital

exchanges provided by China, Singapore, Japan, Germany and

Australia. However, the international telecommunications connections

are still very limited and most domestic telephone and telegraph

services still operate over land lines and HF radio circuits. Most

of the connections are still provided by manual exchanges.

All international telecommunications pass through either of two

international gateway switches connected to two SATCOM ground

stations in Thanlyin: one (a Standard-B terminal commissioned in

1979) handles traffic to seven countries (including India and

Thailand); the other (a Standard-A terminal commissioned in March

1984) handles traffic to 13 other countries. For domestic satellite

communications (primarily long-distance telephone services in the

strategic border areas), Burma has leased a quarter of a transponder

on the AsiaSat 1 communications satellite; a hub station was

established at Thanlyin in 1993 and 14 SATCOM terminals set up in

remote areas in 1993-94.

There are now 12 6 GHz microwave routes in Burma which link

exchanges in Rangoon and Mandalay with 30 provincial towns and which

carry television broadcasts as well as long-distance telephone

traffic. All trunk connections, whether microwave or land-line, pass

through either of two crossbar national transit exchanges in Rangoon

and Mandalay.

The development and operation of domestic and international postal,

telegraph, telephone and telex services in Burma is the

responsibility of Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), which

is controlled by the Ministry of Communications, Posts and

Telegraph. Monitoring of domestic telephone conversations is

widespread, especially when critics of the government or associates

of critics are involved. All domestic long-distance connections can

be intercepted and recorded at the exchanges in Rangoon and

Mandalay. All international telecommunications are monitored in

Rangoon, presumably at the gateway switches connected to the SATCOM

ground stations. Telephone conversations and telex messages are

recorded; connections are cut on both censorship and more general

security grounds.

This ability was dramatically exemplified in May 1996 when a BBC

World Service broadcast to Burma carrying a live telephone interview

with Aung San Suu Kyi disappeared off the airwaves about halfway

through the scheduled programme; the SLORC's monitors simply cut the

telephone connection.

More recently, the SLORC acquired an ability to intercept mobile

SATCOM telephone and fax transmissions. By the end of 1995, some of

the dissident organisations with offices in Bangkok had realised

that the public telecommunications services between Bangkok and

Rangoon were not secure and mobile Sat-phones were smuggled into

Burma. The (opposition) National Coalition Government of the Union

of Burma (NCGUB), for example, began to use a Sat-phone for

communications between Rangoon and Bangkok on 19 November 1996, and

over the next six months the SLORC intercepted and recorded all the

communications through this system. Several NCGUB members and their

associates were arrested in June 1997 on the basis of these

intercepts.

EW capabilities

Since the early 1990s, the Tatmadaw has acquired some modest EW

capabilities. Most of these have been provided by China, but it

seems that some have also come from Singapore.

The Burmese navy has 16 Yan Sit Aung (or Hainan) class coastal

patrol vessels, acquired from China since 1991, which are equipped

with the BM/HZ-8610 ELINT/ESM system. Produced by the Southwest

China Research Institute of Electronic Equipment in Chengdu,

Sichuan, the BM/HZ-8610 system is a high-sensitivity (better than

-70 dBW) and high accuracy DF system (2.5 RMS) which covers the 2-18

GHz frequency band. A sophisticated radar signal processing

capability provides warning, DF and analysis of hostile radar

systems. The system has a radar data storage capability of 500-1,000

modes.

The air force has also reportedly set up a relatively crude EW

capability, again with Chinese assistance, with units dispersed

mainly to locations around the country's northern and eastern

periphery.

Monitoring and jamming HF radio broadcasts

Monitoring HF radio broadcasts, including both foreign news

broadcasts and clandestine broadcasts, has been one of the most

lucrative sources of intelligence available to the Burmese

dictatorship. While sometimes highly informative, however, it has

also been a very frustrating exercise. Some of the broadcast

services beamed propaganda against the regime; most have been highly

critical of its brutalities; some have even been used by insur-gent

groups to provide strategic communications.

In 1995, the Tatmadaw acquired a capability to jam these HF

broadcasts. The equipment was presumably provided by China and is

evidently operated by the Defence Forces Broadcasting Unit at

Taunggyi in Shan State, which maintains a large transmitter.

Conclusions

The Tatmadaw is now the largest and best equipped military force

that Burma has ever mustered. It is now the second largest in

Southeast Asia and will probably be the largest by the turn of the

century. Command and control, communications, SIGINT, electronic

surveillance and EW systems have been important components of the

Tatmadaw's expansion and modernisation.

At least until the late 1980s, some of the insurgent groups, such as

the CPB and the KNLA, were at least as proficient at SIGINT

activities as the front-line Tatmadaw units. The CPB obtained

signals equipment and encryption devices, as well as assistance with

breaking Burmese ciphers, from China, while the KNLA was able to

acquire modern radio communications systems commercially in

Thailand.

By January-February 1995, when the Tatmadaw captured Manerplaw and

Kawmura - the last strongholds of the KNLA and associated resistance

groups in Burma - the Tatmadaw had obtained the ability to dominate

the radio spectrum. On the one hand, the Tatmadaw intercepted all

radio communications between the KNU/ KNLA high command and the HQs

of the KNLA brigades as well as much of the KNLA's walkie-talkie

traffic in the field. The intercepts provided the SLORC with an

extraordinary account of events at Manerplaw and Kawmura from

December 1994 to March 1995 and included discussions about

defections from the KNLA, details of planning for military

operations, casualties, logistic problems, reinforcement

possibilities and the final decisions to abandon the Manerplaw and

Kawmura bases. On the other hand, the Tatmadaw had acquired new

radio sets from China which used frequency-hopping techniques that

defied interception by the KNLA. The defeat of the rebel groups was

not due to the Tatmadaw's ascendancy with respect to SIGINT

capabilities. Rather, it was caused by the debilitating factionalism

within the rebel organisations and, ultimately, by the Tatmadaw's

overwhelming superiority in troops and weapons. However, the

Tatmadaw's SIGINT capabilities were an important factor.

The SLORC also acquired fairly comprehensive capabilities for

monitoring telecommunications, including domestic and international

telephone and facsimile traffic. Provided mainly by Singapore, these

capabilities are quite sophisticated and are directed primarily at

the suppression of urban dissent. Burma is now also acquiring modern

information warfare (IW) systems, again from Singapore.

Burma remains in most respects a very undeveloped country. The

political regime is the most brutal in Asia. Most of the

transportation and communications infrastructure, including the

public telecommunications network, is primitive. However, Burma now

has a substantial and increasingly potent SIGINT capability. It has

been extremely effective in counter-insurgency operations as well as

in suppressing urban dissent. With Singapore and Thailand being the

two important exceptions, Burma's SIGINT/EW capabilities are now

superior to those of most of the other countries in Southeast Asia

in terms of modern conventional military operations.

Desmond Ball is a Professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies

Centre of the Australian National University, Canberra.