Burma's armed forces: - preparing for the 21st century

Jane's Intelligence Review

November 1, 1998

SECTION: ASIA; Vol. 10; No. 11; Pg. 28

LENGTH: 3764 words

HEADLINE: Burma's armed forces: - preparing for the 21st century

BYLINE: William Ashton

HIGHLIGHT: William Ashton examines the expansion of Burma's armed forces, concluding that the regime may well become one of the best-equipped in Southeast Asia.

BODY:

Since the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council

(SLORC) in 1988, the Burmese armed forces (or Tatmadaw) have been

engaged in an ambitious expansion and modernisation programme.

Despite the country's chronic economic problems, this programme is

continuing under the SLORC's successor, the State Peace and

Development Council (SPDC). The programme is unprecedented in its

size and scope, and includes measures to improve almost all aspects

of Burma's military capabilities.

If it is successful, then by the turn of the century Burma will have

one of the largest and best-equipped armed forces in Southeast Asia,

with a greatly improved capacity to conduct both unconventional and

conventional military operations. The Tatmadaw will thus be in a

stronger position to dominate Burma's domestic political

development. Its increased military strength and higher

international profile, particularly its relationship with China,

will also give Burma a greater potential to influence the region's

wider strategic environment.

Personnel

Since 1988, the Tatmadaw has dramatically increased in size.

Estimates vary, but the number of Burmese men and women in uniform

appears to have increased from around 186,000 in 1988, to between

350,000 and 400,000 now. Senior Burmese officials have stated that

the regime's ultimate goal is a well-equipped military machine of

about 500,000 by the turn of the century.

This dramatic increase in manpower is being achieved by a variety of

means, including propaganda campaigns in the state-controlled news

media, financial and other inducements for new recruits, various

kinds of conscription and other forms of coercion. Also, under the

current military regime, a career in the Tatmadaw offers young

Burmese one of the few means for them to gain precious technical

skills, get access to scarce services and consumer goods, and to

achieve a measure of social mobility.

The SLORC and SPDC have also taken steps to increase the

paramilitary capabilities of the police and militia. There are signs

that even the country's fire and medical services are now viewed as

members of the wider defence services, and would be called upon to

support the military regime in any emergency.

This trend is in stark contrast to the rest of the Asia-Pacific

region, where all other countries are reducing the size of their

armed forces. The trend in Burma, however, looks likely to continue

for at least the next few years.

Order of battle

Over the past 10 years, the SLORC and SPDC have purchased a wide

range of new and more modern weapon systems and military equipment

for the Tatmadaw. All three services have benefitted from this

programme.

The Burmese Army, for example, has reportedly taken delivery of

around 80 Type 69 main battle tanks, more than 100 Type 63 light

amphibious tanks, and 250 or more Type 85 armoured personnel

carriers. It has also acquired new field and anti-aircraft artillery

(including multiple rocket launchers and shoulder-fired

surface-to-air missiles), transport and construction vehicles,

communications equipment, infantry weapons and ammunition. Most of

these arms have come from China, and it is possible that more are

still to be delivered.

The Burma Air Force has acquired more than 140 new combat aircraft,

including at least three squadrons of F-7 fighter-interceptors, two

squadrons of A-5 fighter-ground attack aircraft, one squadron of G-4

counter-insurgency aircraft, about one squadron of dual-seat jet

trainers and at least one squadron of Y-8 turbo-prop transport

aircraft. It has also taken delivery of about 50 transport and

attack helicopters. There are reliable reports that the air force is

actively pursuing orders of additional fighter-interceptors, assault

helicopters, transports and training aircraft, mainly from China and

Russia.

Since 1988 the Burmese Navy has taken delivery of nearly 30 naval

vessels. This includes at least 16 Hainan class coastal patrol boats

and four Houxin guided missile fast attack craft from China, and

three PB-90 inshore patrol boats from Yugoslavia. It has also

commissioned a number of smaller motor gunboats from local

shipyards. More naval vessels are reportedly on order, including two

or three Jianghu frigates, a small number of ocean minesweepers and

possibly additional patrol boats, all from China.

Command, control, communications and intelligence

The Rangoon regime's military expansion and modernisation programme

has been accompanied by a sweeping reorganisation of Burma's command

and control system. In 1990 the Ministry of Defence in Rangoon was

reshaped, and a powerful Office of Strategic Studies formed under

SLORC's Secretary and Director of Defence Services Intelligence,

Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt. In addition, the number of regional

military commands has been increased to 12. Fifteen semi-autonomous

sub-regional commands have also been created, partly to provide

greater operational focus and flexibility, but also to permit closer

military administration of critical areas , such as the eastern

Shan State.

A large number of new army units have been created, including two

Light Infantry Divisions, armour and artillery formations and

specialised engineer battalions. Bases have been established or

expanded in areas where, before 1988, there was little or no

permanent army presence. Also, the number and geographical

distribution of Burma's major naval bases and air stations have been

increased, and improvements made to their supporting infrastructure.

Certain critical maintenance and support functions, once performed

only in Rangoon, have been decentralised for greater efficiency.

A major effort has also been put into the improvement of Burma's

antiquated military communications network. With the help of

countries like Singapore, modern computers and other electronic

equipment has been installed in the Ministry of Defence, and

probably also at the headquarters of the 12 regional military

commands. Radios and other communications equipment at the

operational level have been substantially upgraded. Also, Burma's

electronic surveillance capabilities seem to have been improved, at

both the strategic and operational levels.

The country's intelligence apparatus too has been significantly

expanded and improved. This has been in large part to help the

Rangoon regime predict and counter any signs of renewed internal

unrest (including in the Tatmadaw itself), in order to retain its

grip on political power. A considerable effort, however, has also

been put into purely military intelligence, to improve the regime's

strategic intelligence assessments and the Tatmadaw's operational

capabilities.

Training and doctrinal development

As part of most major arms deals negotiated by the SLORC and SPDC

over the past ten years, training packages have been included.

Burmese personnel from all three services have received extensive

training in China, while members of the air force have also been

trained in Poland and Yugoslavia. The Burmese Navy has also trained

in Yugoslavia. There have also been reports that specialist training

courses, for a parachute team and intelligence officers, have been

provided by Singapore. In some cases, foreign instructors appear to

have been sent to conduct training in Burma, for example from China

and Russia.

As far as can be determined, the training provided to the Tatmadaw

to date seems to have been related largely to the operation and

maintenance of its new weapons and equipment purchases. It does not

appear that much attention has been devoted to investigating foreign

approaches to strategic analysis or war-fighting, nor to

incorporating foreign ideas into the development of new military

doctrines, operating procedures or tactics. Some thought, however,

has apparently been given to increasing the number of Burmese

military officers attending overseas staff colleges, in places like

China, India and Malaysia.

Defence industries

To underpin all these initiatives, the SLORC and SPDC have taken a

number of important steps to strengthen Burma's defence scientific

and industrial base. The aim seems to be twofold: to increase the

logistic support available to the new, expanded and more diversified

Tatmadaw, and to help release Burma from its former dependence on

outside suppliers for critical defence materiel.

For example, Burma has launched a major defence import substitution

programme. Details are difficult to obtain, but there is little

doubt that the country's already extensive network of arms and

ammunition factories is being modernised and expanded. Older

factories are being upgraded and new plants are being built, a

number with foreign help. An effort has also been made to upgrade

Burma's abilities to produce its own small armoured cars and

specialised fighting vehicles.

Ancillary industries, like iron and steel plants, are being

modernised to provide the necessary materials for the new factories,

and stockpiles of strategic raw materials are probably being

increased.

Despite claims by a number of ethnic insurgent groups, notably the

Karens and the Kachins, there is no firm evidence that the Tatmadaw

is either manufacturing or using exotic weapons like chemical and

biological agents. It would appear that a chemical weapons programme

begun by former President Ne Win in the early 1980s (with German

help) was abandoned after only a few years. Suggestions that the

SLORC or SPDC has received assistance from China to develop such

weapons for use against ethnic insurgents, are spurious.

Capabilities

The massive expansion of the armed forces, the acquisition of all

these new weapon systems and equipment, and its improved defence

industrial base, all give Burma the potential for greatly increased

operational capabilities.

Before 1988, the Burmese Army was essentially a poorly-equipped

light infantry force capable only of limited counter-insurgency

operations. It suffered from a lack of mobility, insufficient fire

support, poor logistics and inadequate communications. For its part,

the Burmese Air Force was small, ill-equipped and crippled by its

dependence on foreign logistics. It was hard-pressed to keep its

aircraft flying and could only perform a very limited role in

support of the army. The Burmese Navy suffered from similar problems

to the air force, and as a result was confined to patrolling Burma's

inland waterways and coastal fringes.

Now, however, the Tatmadaw is capable not only of much larger-scale

counter-insurgency operations but, for the first time in its

history, it has the means to conduct more conventional operations in

defence of the country. The army, for example, is much bigger, more

widely distributed, more mobile and can call on far greater armoured

and artillery support. It can sustain operations at a higher tempo,

and for far longer, than at any time in the past. It is also in a

much better position to fight more than one campaign at a time, if

that is required.

With its new aircraft and upgraded bases, the air force has far

greater flexibility and operational reach than in the past, and is

capable of far greater striking power. Its new communications and

radar equipment can provide a useful air operations picture of the

country for the first time, contributing (with the air force's new

interceptors and air-to-air missiles) to a much more credible air

defence capability.

Similarly, if the navy's modernisation and expansion programme

continues, Burma will be in a much better position to police its

extensive territorial claims and protect its maritime resources from

unauthorised exploitation. Its Houxin class guided missile patrol

boats give the navy its first anti-ship cruise missile capability.

In time, and with the possible arrival of two or three Jianghu class

frigates, the navy could even develop a modest blue water

capability.

Taken together with the regime's reorganisation of the Defence

Ministry, and its improved command, control, communications and

intelligence capabilities, the Tatmadaw is an entirely different

organisation from that which existed before 1988. On paper at least,

it has vastly improved capabilities, not only to put down civil

disturbances and fight rural insurgent groups, but also to counter

more conventional threats.

Problems

First impressions, however, can be misleading. To gain a more

accurate appreciation of the Tatmadaw's real military capabilities,

a number of other factors need to be considered.

The Rangoon regime's massive military expansion and modernisation

programme comes after decades of budgetary and other problems, so

more recent improvements are from a very low base. Also, Burma's new

weapon systems are a great advance compared with its older

inventory, but they are rarely state-of-the-art (although the SPDC

is seriously considering the purchase of MiG-29 interceptors from

Russia). There are still serious logistics problems, exacerbated by

the Tatmadaw's attempts to diversify its arms suppliers. (The air

force, for example, has aircraft from at least eight different

countries in its inventory.)

Also, all three services are facing problems in keeping their

equipment operational. There have been complaints, for example, that

some of the naval vessels acquired from China and Yugoslavia are

unsuited to Burmese conditions and are difficult to maintain.

Similar criticisms have been made about some of the Chinese

equipment delivered to the Burmese Army. There are reports that the

new artillery pieces misfire often and the armoured vehicles have a

tendency to break down. Chinese trucks have not proven as sturdy or

reliable as the Japanese vehicles used before 1988. For its part,

the air force has found that the Chinese have not provided some

important parts for their new fighters, nor given sufficient

training to Burmese pilots in their use.

While they are gradually improving, through overseas training and

the Tatmadaw's own specialised educational institutions, the

technical skills of the navy and air force still do not appear high

enough. This problem is probably made worse by the lure of better

paid jobs for trained technical personnel in the private sector -

now able to operate more freely under the military regime's 'open

door' economic policies. The army is also facing personnel problems,

many arising from poor man-management, harsh conditions of service

and low morale.

Despite all this, the overall quality of the Burmese armed forces is

improving, and seems likely to continue doing so. Progress may be

slow in some particular areas, and it may take time for the three

services to learn how to use their new weapons systems to the

greatest effect, but technical problems can be overcome and new

operating procedures can be learnt. A number of foreign governments

seem prepared - albeit covertly - to assist in this process. The

overall trend is thus for the more proficient use of military force,

against a wider range of potential adversaries.

The outlook is thus for the Tatmadaw to enter the new century as a

much bigger, better-equipped and more capable defence force.

The economic dimension

The dramatic increase in Burma's order of battle has been achieved

through an equally dramatic increase in the country's defence

spending. While accurate statistics are impossible to obtain - a

problem probably even shared by the Burmese government itself - it

would appear that in some years since 1988 the country's defence

spending has exceeded 35 per cent of central government

expenditures. On occasion it may have gone considerably higher.

In some cases, the SLORC and SPDC have resorted to barter and

counter-trade agreements to acquire new arms, using Burma's abundant

natural resources to pay for purchases, instead of using scarce

foreign currency. Burma has also been greatly assisted by a range of

soft loans and other special arrangements provided by arms

suppliers, notably China. Although details are very difficult to

come by, it is believed that hard currency generated from narcotics

production may have also been used by the government in Rangoon -

either directly or indirectly - to pay for some of Burma's new

weapons.

Other targets for the regime's increased defence spending have been

Burma's new arms industries, and the Tatmadaw's greatly expanded

network of specialised training and health facilities. In many

cases, the latter seems designed to replicate or replace similar

institutions in the civil sector, which since 1988 have been starved

of government funds and (in the tertiary education sector) subject

to lengthy closures.

Yet Burma has long been facing serious economic problems, a

situation now exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis and

consequent reduction in foreign investment. While the SPDC is still

pursuing the SLORC's expansion and modernisation programme, there

must come a time when critical adjustments will need to be made.

Even with the considerable help being given by some friendly arms

suppliers, Burma's very high level of defence expenditure cannot be

sustained indefinitely.

The political dimension

While the massive expansion and modernisation of the armed forces

since 1988 has direct implications for Burma's future defence

capabilities, there is also the critical political dimension to

consider. For a much stronger, better equipped and more efficiently

managed Tatmadaw gives the SPDC the means to exercise even greater

control over internal political developments.

At one level, it permits the regime to enforce its will over the

country in a way never before possible. Indeed, the Tatmadaw's

increased size and military capabilities, combined with the shrewd

manipulation of various ethnic and narcotics-based insurgent groups,

means that the central government's writ now runs over more of Burma

than at any time since it was granted independence in 1948. Having

achieved this aim, it is unlikely that the SPDC or any successor

regime would allow large tracts of the country once again to be

removed from its control.

At another level, it is clear that no civilian government is likely

to emerge in Rangoon without the agreement (in some form) of the

armed forces. This applies as much to a democratic government under

someone like Aung San Suu Kyi, as it does to any tame administration

which might emerge from the regime's current Constitutional

Convention process.

Similarly, any lasting solution to Burma's complex ethnic problems

will depend to a large degree on the willingness and ability of the

Tatmadaw to countenance some sort of compromise. A continuing

insistence by the regime on a strong central government in Rangoon

dominated by ethnic Burmans, at the expense of any power-sharing

arrangements with minority racial groups, will probably see a return

to the fighting of the past. Already, some of the cease-fire

arrangements negotiated by the SLORC and SPDC in recent years are

under pressure, and seem likely to break down.

All these considerations must be premised on the continuing loyalty

and cohesion of the Tatmadaw. Any major fracture in the armed forces

hierarchy, or division of loyalties among the troops, will pose

critical problems for the entire country. At present, the many

factors binding the senior ranks of the armed forces together seem

to be greater than all those which divide them, but this may not

always be the case. There is also the possibility that more junior

officers, unhappy about current policies and practices, may act in

defiance of their seniors, triggering a wider crisis.

The future

If the SLORC and SPDC's target is achieved, then by the turn of the

century Burma will probably have the largest armed forces in

Southeast Asia. Also, the massive injection of new weapon systems

into the Tatmadaw will make it better armed than most other

Southeast Asian countries. In terms of the sheer size of its armed

forces, its order of battle and the government's continuing high

level of defence expenditure, Burma will be a significant military

power in the region.

These developments are more than likely to lead to wider

implications. While Burma is pre-occupied with internal stability,

and does not constitute a threat to any other country, it has become

a significant factor in the strategic calculations of its regional

neighbours. This is largely because Burma's massive military

modernisation programme is being strongly underwritten by China,

from whence most of the regime's new weapon systems, training

packages and concessional finance have come.

It is clear that Burma's close and continuing military relationship

with China is of concern to other regional countries. For example,

it has helped make them impervious to pleas from the Western

democracies to put pressure on Burma over human rights abuses, and

almost certainly persuaded the ASEAN countries to admit Burma to the

association last year. Singapore, for example, seems to have

developed a close military relationship with Burma and, at least

until recently, Indonesia served as a model for Burma's own version

of the military-based dwi fungsi (dual function) socio-political

system. Both countries seem to have been prompted to encourage such

links out of concern for China's presence in Burma. India too has

been anxious to reduce China's influence over the military regime in

Rangoon.

Burma is not entirely unaware of these concerns. Indeed, while it

sees few options at present other than to maintain close ties with

China, it probably shares them itself. The military regime in

Rangoon has, however, managed to trade very successfully on the

region's fears of China, not only to fend off international

criticism of its poor human-rights record but also to consolidate

its domestic political position. However, it remains to be seen

whether it can continue to use China in this way or will inevitably

fall under the sway of its larger and more powerful neighbour.

Whatever the outcome, Burma will almost certainly be a much more

important factor in the regional strategic environment as it enters

the 21st century.

GRAPHIC: Photograph 1, Top: A Chinese Jianghu frigate. Burma has reportedly ordered several of these, although details are unclear.; Photograph 2, Few details and even less imagery is available of Burma's Houxin class guided missile fast attack craft, similar in design to these Chinese vessels.; Photograph 3, The latest variant of China's A-5 'Fantan, displayed at Zhuhai in November 1996. Although this appears to be a new- production aircraft, Burma has two squadrans ofthe older A-5 fighter-ground attack versions.; Photograph 4, CAC's latest F-7 development, the F-7MG which made its public debut in November 1996. Burma has three squadrons of F-7 fighter-interceptors.; Photograph 5, A Norinco type 69-II main battle tank, of which the Burmese Army fields 80.; Photograph 6, A type-85 armoured personnel carrier. Numbers are unconfirmed, but it is believed that the Burmese Army has recently taken delivery of at least 250.