Link: World Fleet List, Myanmar
Jane's Intelligence Review
January 1, 1994, SECTION: Vol.
6; No. 1; Pg. 36
LENGTH: 1763 words
HEADLINE: The Burmese Navy
BYLINE: William Ashton
BODY:
Introduction
Of all Burma's Armed Forces, the navy is
perhaps the most overlooked
and the least understood. Since Burma
(Myanmar) received its
independence from Britain in 1948, the
navy's role in the many
counterinsurgency campaigns waged by the
central government has been
less conspicuous that those of the other
services. Also, since
General Ne Win's coup in 1962, the navy has
held only a token
position in the military regime which has
run the country for the
past 30 years under various guises. Yet,
the navy has always been,
and remains, an important factor in Burma's
internal security.
Background
The Burmese Navy had its origins in the
Burma Royal Navy Volunteer
Reserve. This force was formed in 1940 and
played an active part in
Allied operations against the Japanese
duirng the Second World War.
In 1947, the Union of Burma Navy was formed
with a frigate and four
gunboats transferred from Great Britain. In
1950-51, the USA added
10 coast-guard patrol boats under a Mutual
Defence Assistance
Programme (MDAP).
Together with a flotilla of small motor
launches and converted
civilian craft, these vessels played an
important part in Rangoon's
fight against the ethnic and ideological
insurgent groups which
initially threatened the fledgling Union
government. The navy
performed both a defensive and offensive
role, protecting convoys,
carrying supplies, ferrying troops and
giving much needed fire
support. While it was instrumental in
relieving the port city of
Moulmein (captured by Karen rebels), the
navy's effort was directed
almost entirely inland. Although one armed
river boat defected to
the Karens, the navy was largely unopposed
and managed to maintain
control over Burma's crucial inland
waterways throughout this early
period.
In the years that followed, the navy
acquired a number of additional
vessels, almost all from overseas. The USA,
for example, donated
another 27 ships and small craft under the
MDAP. Also, the Ne Win
regime purchased a range of new coastal and
inshore patrol boats
after the 1962 military coup. By the end of
the 1980s, the Burmese
Navy operated four corvettes -- two ex-US
ships commissioned in the
1940s, and two built in Burma's own
Dawbonshipyards in 1960.
The fleet also included a mixture of light
forces ranging from 50 to
380 t displacement. There were 21 coastal
and inshore patrol boats,
18 gunboats and 40 river patrol craft of
various kinds.
Current Establishment and Role
Twelve of the more modern patrol boats now
operated by the navy are
formally part of the People's Pearl and
Fishery Corporation (PPFC).
These include six Carpentaria class inshore
patrol boats purchased
from Australia in 1979-80, three Swift type
coastal patrol boats
purchased from Singapore in 1980 and three
Osprey class inshsore
patrol boats built in Denmark between 1980s
and 1982.
All the vessels operated by the navy and
PPFC are relatively small,
thinly armoured and lightly armed. As their
nature suggests, the
primary task of the Burmese Navy is, and
has always been, patrolling
the country's rivers and inshore waters in
support fo the army's
counterinsurgency operations. Typically,
about one-third of the
fleet is dedicated to this task at any one
time. The navy is used
for reconnaissance, fire support,
amphibious operations, and static
defences around strategic towns. Most
population centres in the
Irrawaddy delta, for example, have at least
one armed landing craft
assigned to it, with a dedicated force of
soldiers.
The navy's secondary role is coastal
surveillance and fisheries
protection. Burma's coastline is 1930 km
long and, as far as
resources allow is constantly patrolled
against insurgent groups and
smugglers. Coastal operations in the
southernmost Tenasserim
Division, for example, are particularly
intensive. There is the
perennial problem of Thai and Malaysian
fishermen poaching in Burma's
waters. Also, there are blackmarketeers
importing contraband, Mon
insurgents and even pirates. All try to
take advantage of the Mergui
archipelago's proximity to Thailand, as
well as its many islands and
inlets, to conduct their activities.
Ever since the retirement of its one Second
World War vitage frigate,
the navy has had no real blue water
capability. Burma claims a 200
nautical mile exclusive economic zone,
however, and has already
authorised extensive offshore oil and gas
exploration by about a
dozen foreign companies. Should significant
deposits of hydrocarbons
be found, there could be a greater need to
defend Burma's 148 600
km2 clai of extended jursidiction, Given
theregime's desperate need
for foreign exchange and its suspicions of
most other countries, such
a discovery may be sufficient impetus for
it to try and acquire
larger sea-going vessels.
The fleet is normally assinged through a
number of regional commands.
Vessels are based at Rangoon (Monkey
Point), Bassein, Mergui,
Moulmein, Seikyi and Sittwe (Akyab). The
main naval dockyard is
located at Rangoon where facilities exist
to handle most aspects of
ship repair. It is also where virtually all
naval supplies are
stored and issued. The Naval Training
Centre is at Syriam, across
the Pegu river from Rangoon.
A New Look
In recent years, the Burmese Navy has
undergone a number of important
changes. Since it formally took power in
September 1988, the ruling
State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLSORC) has taken steps to
expand all branches of the armed forces and
increase their
capabilities. The navy has not benefitted
from this policy as much
as the other services but over the past
five years manpower levels
have jumped from about 7000 to 15 000 (with
one battalion of naval
infantry).
The navy has also acquired a number of new
craft. In December 1990,
it purchased three PB 90 class coastal
patrol boats from Yugoslavia.
These were originally built by
Brodotechnika for an unnamed African
country and were completed in 1986-87. When
the African sale fell
through, they were laid up until the SLORC
was able to purchase them
at a much reduced price. At the time of
sale, the 80 t, 28 m boats
were fitted with two 20 mm guns, one on the
forecastle and one aft.
They have a maximum speed of 32 knots and
an effective range (at 25
knots) of 400 nautical miles.
Photo: Hainan class patrol boat
This order was followed by another for 10
Hainan class fast attack
boats and a number of smaller craft from
China. As part of a massive
$1.4 billion arms deal between Burma and
the People's Republic, the
purchase of these boats followed the visit
to China in October 1989
of a delegation from the Burmese Armed
Forces. The 375 t Hainan
class boats are 59 m long and capable of 30
knots. They have an
effective range of 1300 nautical miles at
15 knots. Normally, this
class is armed with twin 57 mm and 25 mm
guns both fore and aft. Six
of these boats were delivered in January
1991 and another four
arrived in Burma in early 1993. Members of
the Burmese Navy were
reportedly sent to China and Yugoslavia,
each for up to one year, to
train on these new acquisitions.
Furthermore, the SLORC has embarked on a
major programme to
upgrade its naval infrastructure. This
project appears to include the
development of existing naval bases at
Sittwe near the Bangladeshi
border and at Mergui near the Thai border.
Also, there have been
persistent, if still unconfirmed, reports
that the Chinese plan to
help the SLORC build a new naval base at
Hainggyi Island at the mouth
of the Bassein river. This plan has been
connected with the possible
construction (or upgrading) of a maritime
reconnaissance station on
Great Coco Island, just north of the
Indian-held Andaman Group.
Moreover, there have also been reports in
Indian journals that other
naval bases are planned along the southern
coast, including Bassein
Personnel and Training
These new vessels and facilities would add
significantly to Burma's
maritime capabilities. The navy continues
to suffer, however, from
one major drawback. Ever since the 1962
coup, all political
processes in Burma have been dominated by
Ne Win and the army; Ne
Win's original 17-man Revolutionary Council
inlcuded only one navy
officer (see JIR, Vol 5, No 10 pp 466-471).
Members of the service
subsequently held senior positions in the
Burma Socialist Programme
Party and in the parliament which was
created in 1974. Their
membership gave the navy a voice in
national affairs and promoted the
image of military unity. There are now two
seniro navy officers in
the SLORC. Yet, these positions have always
been overshadowed by
those held by army officers. Furthermore,
the navy has always had to
endure a measure of distrust.
Throughout the navy's early years, a large
proportion of its officers
were trained overseas in the USA, the UK,
Sweden, Denmark, Japan or
Yugoslavia. Overseas training continued for
the navy even after the
1962 coup when most military links with the
outside world were
abruptly severed. More recently, members of
the navy have been
trained in China and Yugoslavia. Also,
naval recruits have tended to
be better educated men from urban areas, as
opposed to the less
educated rural recruits usually taken into
the army. The regime's
fear that these factors may have
'contaminated' the personnel
concerned and made them politically
'unreliable' was confirmed in
1988 when a number of navy officers and
ratings joined in the
widespread pro-democracy demonstrations.
Conclusions
Whatever misgivings Ne Win and his army
proteges in the SLORC may
have, however, the navy will continue to
have an important role to
play in Burma's internal affairs.
Currently, Burma faes no external
threats to speak of other than the old
problems of popular and ethnic
unrest, smuggling and fish poaching which
continue to demand
attention. Patrols along the Arakan coast
and rivers have
traditionally been of minor importnace but
have significantly been
increased in order to support the amry's
operations against the local
Muslim population. Also, the renewed
outbreak of Karen insurgent
activity in the Irrawaddy delta in late
1991 placed considerable
demands on the navy. As long as the armed
forces cling to power in
Burma, there is little likelihood that the
navy will run short of
missions.
William Ashton is a freelance journalist
living in Australia.
GRAPHIC: Photograph 1, The Carpentaria
class inshore patrol boat has a complement of 10 and can mount one 12.7 mm machine gun.;
Photograph 2, Burma purchased three of these Osprey-50 vessels from Denmark in the early
1980s. Each of the 50 m craft has a helicopter deck on the aft deck. Here, the MS Inma and
MS Inya undergo trials before being handed over to the People's Pearl and Fishery
Corporation.; Photograph 3, Ten of these Hainan class fast attack boats were recently
purchased from China.