Jane's Intelligence Review
November 1, 1995
SECTION: ASIA; Vol. 7; No. 11; Pg. 515
LENGTH: 3174 words
HEADLINE: The Burmese army
BYLINE: Andrew Selth
BODY:
Before 1988, the Burmese army was a lightly
equipped infantry force, organized and deployed for counter-insurgency operations. Its 40
years of continuous campaigning against insurgents has made it into an experienced and
battle-hardened force. It has also grown from 170,000 to about 300,000 officers and men,
with a goal of about 475,000 by the end of the decade. This increase in manpower is being
accompanied by a massive arms procurement programme. Andrew Selth looks at the
developments and the capabilities.
The Burmese army (BA) traces its origins to
the various nationalist
military forces which were formed during
the Second World War.
Thanks to a dramatic switch in its
allegiances late in the war, the puppet Burma National Army survived to become the nucleus
of the new BA when the country regained its independence from the UK in 1948.
Almost immediately, however, the country
was plunged into civil war. To protect the new union and restore unity, the government of
Prime Minister U Nu authorized a rapid expansion of the army.
At that time, the BA consisted of a mere 10
front line battalions or about 15,000 men. With help mainly from the UK, its strength was
built up to more than 40 battalions by 1953 when the central government took back the
initiative from the insurgents. These troops were supported by armoured and artillery
regiments, engineer units, a medical corps, as well as supply and signals elements.
Operational command in the field was
exercised through a framework of nine Regional Commands. Depending on the size of the
command and its operational requirements, regional commanders had at their disposal up to
10 garrison infantry battalions, managed through a number of Tactical Operations Commands
(TOCs). There were also eight Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) but, like naval and air
assets, these units remained under the command of the defence minister.
Operational control was passed to regional
commanders by Rangoon as circumstances dictated. With a little more foreign assistance,
this steady increase in strength continued under General Ne Win, who seized power from U
Nu in 1962. By the beginning of 1988, the army consisted of 165 regular infantry
battalions, two armoured battalions, four artillery battalions, and one light
anti-aircraft artillery battalion.
The army after 1988
Within a year of the takeover by the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the BA had grown from about 170,000 to over
200,000 all ranks. By the beginning of 1995, its strength stood at 265,000 officers and
men, with the main combat element consisting of 223 infantry battalions. There were also
four armoured battalions, seven artillery battalions and 17 independent artillery
companies. The number of anti-aircraft artillery battalions had risen to two. Of the
infantry battalions, 145 were in garrison with the Regional Commands under 32 TOCs. The
remaining battalions were shared between the LIDs. It is always difficult to arrive at an
accurate Burmese order of battle but, by any estimate, it was a remarkable expansion in a
short time.
The SLORC has also introduced a number of
changes to the army's command structure and the deployment of its forces. After 1988, the
country's most senior military officer became the SLORC's chairman, prime minister and
defence minister, as well as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Since May 1989, each
Service has had its own commander-in-chief and chief of staff. The army
commander-in-chief, now a full general, also acts as deputy commander-in-chief of the
armed forces. The positions of all regional commanders have been raised to the level of
major general. In addition, by early 1990, a tenth Regional Command was formed in Burma's
northwest, the area facing India. Eight Regional Commands have two TOCs, while two have
four TOCs.
A number of additional formations have been
created, including two new LIDs. There are now at least 23 independent engineer companies
and nine signal companies. The number of military intelligence companies has also
increased from as few as 12 before 1988 to 23 by mid-1992. These new intelligence units
have been assigned to not only potential centres of civil unrest like the major towns and
cities but also posts along the Chinese, Indian and Bangladeshi borders. The number of
infantry battalions along this western border has been increased from five to 32, and
there are now 20 new battalions in the Shan State.
The rapid increase in the army's numbers
after 1988 was achieved through a vigorous recruitment campaign carried out mainly in
impoverished rural villages where young men have little chance of regular
employment. Many were attracted by the promise of a cash payment on enlistment and later
access to the relatively generous pay, privileges and perquisites which are enjoyed by
members of the armed forces in Burma. Also, recruiting standards have been lowered. There
have been reports of recruits being accepted as young as 15 years old and the BA is said
to be enlisting orphans and homeless children, counting on their gratitude to ensure
continuing loyalty to the military regime. Since 1988, considerable efforts have also been
made to expand the size and functions of the People's Police Force which now functions
essentially as a part of the army.
It was, in part, to equip these much larger
forces that, soon after it assumed control of the government, the SLORC embarked on a
massive arms purchasing programme. Within months, Singapore had shipped 84 mm rockets for
Carl Gustav recoilless guns. In August 1989, Singapore was again accused of providing arms
to the SLORC when weapons and ammunition originating in Belgium and Israel were
trans-shipped to Burma, apparently with the assistance of a newly formed Singapore-based
joint venture with the Burmese regime. These shipments apparently included second-hand
RPG-2 grenade launchers and 57 mm M43 anti-tank guns of Eastern bloc origin, possibly
taken from captured Palestinian stocks.
In an attempt to outflank India, Pakistan
was also quick to take advantage of the SLORC's need for arms. In 1989, an agreement was
reached for Pakistan to sell the SLORC 150 machine guns, 50,000 rounds of ammunition and
5000x120 mm mortar bombs. Further arms shipments from Pakistan were reportedly halted by
Benazir Bhutto but they were later resumed under her successor as prime minister, Nawaz
Sharif. These later shipments included additional mortars, rocket launchers, assault
rifles and ammunition valued at about US$20 million. Before the practice was stopped by
the USA, many of these weapons were siphoned off foreign arms shipments sent to Pakistan
for the mujahideen in Afghanistan.
These munitions were supplemented by small
arms and ammunition from China. Since 1989, Burma has reportedly ordered some 10,000x7.62
mm Type 56 assault rifles, 40 mm anti-tank grenade launchers, 82 mm mortars (probably Type
67 and Type 55), as well as 57 mm and 75 mm recoilless guns (probably Type 56 and Type
52). A number of RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers may have been included. Ammunition was
supplied for all these weapons, together with 62 mm and 66 mm HEAT projectiles. China also
provided the army with radar and communications equipment, night vision devices and 800
military parachutes.
The SLORC has also tapped other suppliers.
In late 1992, a Portuguese arms manufacturer reportedly sold the SLORC some US$1.5 million
worth of arms and ammunition, despite a European Commission arms embargo against Burma.
Included in the shipment were 120 mm heavy mortars, 81 mm medium mortars, and possibly
some 60 mm light mortars. There were also said to be 20,000 mortar bombs and artillery
shells in the order. In late 1990, North Korea sold Burma 20 million rounds of 7.62 mm
rifle ammunition. Singaporean companies have sold the SLORC M16A1 automatic rifles and
5.56 mm ammunition in defiance of US export laws. Israel provided a consignment of Uzi 9
mm submachine guns. While specific shipments have not been identified, the BA's munitions
holdings suggest that France may have sold Burma mortar ammunition, while Czechoslovakia,
South Korea and South Africa have reportedly provided additional small arms and
ammunition.
Since 1988, the BA has obtained a wide
range of heavier equipment. Most has come from China. To modernize and strengthen its
armoured warfare capabilities, for example, the SLORC initially purchased about 85 tanks.
This order probably consisted of 30 Norinco Type 69II main battle tanks and 55 Type 63
light amphibious tanks. Rangoon also appears to have placed an order with Norinco for more
than 100 Type 85 armoured personnel carriers. These early shipments of Chinese vehicles
were followed in late 1993 by an order for an additional 50 T69s, 50 T63s and 150 more
Type 85s.
The Chinese are also reported to have sold
Burma more than 100 artillery pieces. These weapons probably included 122 mm howitzers, a
number of anti-tank guns and at least 30 Norinco 107 mm Type 63 multiple launch rocket
systems. For ground-based air defence, the SLORC has purchased at least 24 Chinese 37 mm
Type 74 twin-barrelled towed anti-aircraft guns, with their associated mobile generators,
radars and directors. The army has also taken delivery of either Norinco twin 57 mm Type
80 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems, or about 12 Norinco single-barrelled 57 mm
towed anti-aircraft gun systems, complete with radars and directors. It is possible that
both systems have, in fact, been supplied. Included among these arms deals was a large
quantity of Hongying HN-5 man-portable shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.
The BA has also acquired a wide range of
new road transport and heavy-duty vehicles. China alone has provided about 1,000 vehicles
since 1988, including 6.5 tonne Aeolus trucks, 5 tonne Jiefang trucks, 2 tonne Lan Jian
trucks, 2 tonne Kungi trucks, and about 300 other heavy-duty machines. The latter has
included Chinese Type 72 tank recovery vehicles and Hanyang tank transporters. In
addition, the SLORC has purchased a number of Star 266 road cranes from Poland and some
East European bridge layers (probably also from Poland). Other purchases include Polish
Star 12.5 ton trucks, Toyota DA-80 and FA-60 trucks, Nissan Container Carriers, Nissan 5
ton diesel trucks and Nissan Patrol four-wheel drive general purpose vehicles.
Included in the SLORC's first large arms
deal with China was an agreement that some 400-600 Burmese officers and men would
undertake instruction in China. Most of this training was to cover the maintenance and
operation of the new Chinese equipment. There have been several reports that up to 75
Chinese instructors have worked in Burma itself, including a number directly advising
troops in the field. Unconfirmed reports also put Pakistani instructors in Burma, helping
the BA familiarize itself with those items of Chinese equipment which are also operated by
Pakistan. Pakistani military instructors may have also provided Burma with special forces
training but this seems unlikely. The Singaporean armed forces have developed a close
relationship with the BA since 1988, and have probably provided it with some training,
possibly in conjunction with equipment sales.
The new army
With its greatly increased numbers, new
weapons, more plentiful supplies of ammunition and greater mobility, the BA in 1995 must
be considered a more formidable force. Arguments over the exact numbers aside, it is now
one of the largest ground forces in Southeast Asia. It is also better equipped than at any
time in its history and, thanks to its 50 years of continuous active service, has more
direct experience of combat in the field than many comparable countries. Given its
development over the past seven years, the BA should also be able to perform a much wider
range of conventional roles, including the defence of the country against attack from an
external enemy.
At first sight, these assumptions would
appear to be justified. During the 1991-92 dry season, for example, the SLORC conducted
concurrent campaigns against insurgents along the borders with Thailand, Bangladesh and
India. From the nature of these operations, it was clear that the BA had benefitted
greatly from its expansion and modernization programme. Its new-found strength was
confirmed during later offensives against the Karen insurgent strongholds of Manerplaw and
Kawmura. The size of these campaigns, the rapid reinforcement of the units deployed, as
well as the sustained fire from recoilless guns, mortars and artillery against the Karen
camps, all suggested better logistics structures, improved road transport, more modern
weapons and increased ammunition stocks.
On paper at least, the army's conventional
defence capabilities should also have improved. Not only is the BA now much larger, but it
is also more mobile and has greatly improved armour, artillery and air defence
inventories. Its command, control, communications and intelligence systems have been
expanded and refined. Burma may still have relatively modest weapon systems compared with
its larger neighbours but it is now in a better position to deter external aggression and
to respond to such a threat should it ever arise.
That said, doubts must still be held about
the BA's ability to capitalize fully on its recent acquisitions. This applies as much to
the conduct of counter-insurgent operations as to the performance of larger scale,
conventional defence roles.
The rapid expansion of the army since 1988
has placed it under considerable strain. Many units seem to be well under strength and
training has suffered badly. There is a serious shortage of qualified and experienced
officers and NCOs, a problem compounded by the SLORC's clear preference for the army's
higher ranks to be filled by ethnic Burmese. The recent dry season offensives against
ethnic insurgent groups and drug lords may have demonstrated some of the army's new
material strengths but they also highlighted a number of major shortcomings in its
doctrine, tactics and leadership.
Burmese casualties from all these campaigns
were reported to be high. In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that there have
been persistent reports of low morale in the army ranks. There are problems at the higher
levels too. There is considerable antagonism, for example, between those officers on
active service in the field and those assigned to more comfortable administrative or
political duties in rear areas. There have been repeated reports of suspicion and rivalry
between the graduates of Burma's prestigios Defence Services Academy (DSA) at Maymyo and
the Officer Training School at Hmawbi. There are also strongly felt differences between
officers who have been promoted on merit and those who have been singled out for
advancement because of their personal loyalty to former President Ne Win. So far, a
workable balance has been maintained in the interests of survival but these divisions
constitute a potentially explosive problem in a country where the unity of the army is
deemed essential for continued political control.
All these problems may be manageable in a
protracted guerrilla war in which the central government enjoys certain military
advantages, can isolate its enemies (both physically and politically) and feels it can
ignore international opinion. These circumstances may not apply, however, in a war against
an external aggressor where such shortcomings could be very costly. The BA lacks any real
experience in large-scale conventional operations. Even joint operations have been
difficult, as demonstrated by the lack of co-ordination between the army and air force
during offensives against ethnic insurgents. A command structure based on 10 LIDs and 10
Regional Commands may be well suited to the conduct of counter-insurgency operations but
would be put under real strain if ever called upon to manage a larger conflict. Burma has
no strategic reserve nor any national mobilization plan. Defending a country the size of
Burma against co-ordinated attacks by a modern force armed with sophisticated weapons
would be a new experience for the BA which would test it severely.
Nor can the army's new weapons and
equipment be counted upon to tip the scales in Burma's favour. Despite the overseas
training provided, the bulk of the army still finds its new equipment unfamiliar and, in
some cases, difficult to handle. There have already been numerous complaints that the
items provided by China are unreliable and unsuited to Burmese conditions. There have also
been problems with maintenance and spare parts. Even in fighting against the drug lord
Khun Sa in mid-1993, Burmese troops were said to be outgunned by the rebels.
Some of the army's problems lie in the
nature of Burma itself - its size, its physical geography and the climate. Other
difficulties, however, can be laid at the door of the military regime in Rangoon. The
failure of Ne Win's 'Burmese Way to Socialism' between 1962 and 1988 deprived the
government of the funds it needed to modernize the armed forces and build a strategic
network of all-weather roads, railways and airfields. Ne Win's refusal to contemplate any
political settlement with Burma's ethnic minorities helped encourage separatist
tendencies. Insurgent groups were also strengthened by the harsh treatment meted out to
minority peoples by the army during its annual counter-insurgency campaigns.
Since 1988, a more serous effort has been
put into winning the allegiance of the ethnic populations or at least neutralizing their
military representatives but no progress has been made. The potential remains for the
internal security situation to deteriorate again very quickly, however. It is difficult to
predict how the BA will develop in the years ahead. Its greatest vulnerabilities are the
rivalries within the officer corps and low morale in the ranks. The conviction that only
the army can provide Burma with the firm leadership it needs, combined with a fear of
retribution from any future civilian government, may hold the army together but policy
differences and competition for senior positions will cause severe strains. These tensions
will increase when Ne Win dies. Above all else, the BA will be weakened by its alienation
from the Burmese population. As long as the military hierarchy is determined to retain
political power and exercises that power through the army, then the BA's military
capabilities will remain limited and its professionalism suspect.
Andrew Selth is a Visiting Researcher at
the Strategic Studies Centre of the Australian National University, Canberra.
GRAPHIC: Map 1, Burma Photograph 1, The
Burmese army on parade.; (Photograph 2, A Davis); Photograph 3, Type 69 tanks on parade by
the Chinese forces. Burma has probably taken delivery of about 80 of these tanks from the
PRC.; Photograph 4, The Burmese army has over 100 of these Type 63 light tanks (front). A
type 59 MBT is shown in the rear.