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THE  HUMANITARIAN CRISIS, AID AND GOVERNANCE IN BURMA

A working paper for The Workshop on Humanitarian Aid to Burma, May 24, 1999

 

Back to the foreword by Aung San Suu Kyi

Introduction

Professor Amartya Sen, recipient of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics, has written extensively on hunger, famine and its causes. He has observed that: "People in economic need also need a political voice....no substantial famine has ever occurred in any country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press." Burma, a country of 48 million people, has an extraordinarily undemocratic government, an unfree press and not uncoincidentally, its population is facing what a confidential UNICEF report termed a "silent emergency."

 

Background: The Cause of the Humanitarian Crisis

Given the complexity of Burma's political situation, assistance on the basis of compassion alone is insufficient. Donors must understand the underlying causes of the crisis and ensure that humanitarian assistance, born of compassionate intentions, neither prolongs nor reinforces the causes of Burma's humanitarian crisis. Attempts to alleviate suffering should not have unintended consequences for either donors or recipients.

The Asian Wall Street Journal described the poverty in rural Burma in an article on April 16, 1999, after visiting some villages in the Southern Shan State. The writer confirmed the findings of a UN Working Group report on Burma published in July, 1998, which stated:

"…Only a major change in direction by the government can turn things around. The U.N. working group report identifies four 'prominent factors' that have constrained human development: Heavily subsidized state-owned enterprises are a drain on resources; spending on defense, as a percentage of the GDP, is twice as high as it is on health and education combined; the public administration system is unaccountable and pays little attention to what is really happening on the ground; and policy formation takes place in a 'climate of adhocism'..beyond that, Myanmar must resolve its political stalemate".

 

The military authorities have foreclosed all opportunities for the development of civil institutions and have nationalized or co-opted all existing non governmental organizations (NGOs) in Burma. Local professional organizations, such as the Burma Medical Association and the Burma Red Cross have been co-opted by the state. The Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association, under the direction of Gen. Khin Nyunt's wife, has been presented to the international community as a legitimate NGO. At the same time, the military has set up a nationwide mass organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), with the mandate to conduct socio-economic development activities-sometimes with international assistance--while its members are routinely organized to attack the National League for Democracy and other democratic forces.

The results of the ongoing political repression in Burma on human development are plain to see. The living standards of the majority are falling while that of a small but visible elite is insulated from the general suffering. More children are suffering from diseases due to malnutrition and some people are starving. Hospitals, when they exist at all, have no medicines and private clinics are unaffordable to all but an affluent few. The universities are closed and the schools are increasingly impoverished. Non-attendance and drop out rates increase while budgets waste away. The government’s failure to address the pressing needs of the population affects many sectors, but particularly food security, health care, education, the environment, and women and children.

Food security:

In Burma, previously referred to as the "rice bowl of Asia", a great part of the people are malnourished and some are starving. Perhaps the greatest reason for this lack of food security is the insecurity of the farmer. Excessive hardships are inflicted on farmers and their families that deny them the right to cultivate and enjoy the fruit of their land. In addition to the hardships caused by the economic crisis, Burma is plagued with a bizarre agricultural system characterized by force: the authorities force villagers to plant particular crops at particular times and then are forced to sell the greatest part of the harvest to the authorities at prices that are unrealistic if not unlivable. The authorities rely on forced procurement of rice at prices that inflict great hardship on farmers. Even in regions so afflicted by drought that paddy cannot be cultivated, the authorities have used the armed forces to threaten and demand that farmers provide twelve baskets of rice per acre.

When villagers do not happen to live in places convenient to the military, they are forced to relocate with virtually no assistance from the people who are driving them off their land. When villagers resist being forced off their land, they are classified as trespassers and moved by force. The Asian Wall Street Journal reports: "Many villagers can no longer depend on farming and fishing. The land is overworked and depleted. In Myinkyadoe village, for example, only 60% of 740 households own land. The other householders, part of a growing band of landless, scramble for jobs as farm laborers for wages of about 70 kyats, or 20 cents, a day."

Villagers are also forced to labor on schemes to irrigate crops they will not benefit from. They are forced again to build the roads that will take their harvests away. The authorities are also forcing people who are undernourished and without the physical strength to earn a living to provide long periods of uncompensated labor on projects to convert virgin, fallow and environmentally critical wetlands into commercial farms. Having to provide long periods of forced labor results in great physical and mental hardships.

The regime, in asserting its' control over all aspects of Burmese society, including the distribution of food, routinely prevent the National League for Democracy from providing rice donations to the impoverished.

Health care:

The health care system in Burma has been in decline for a number of years, and this process has accelerated since 1995. While data are poor and incomplete, there is little question that Burma has lagged sharply as compared to her ASEAN partners in health investment, programs, and outcomes. While public health programs cover approximately 90% of the populations of Vietnam and Thailand, they reach under 60% of Burmese. In Asia, only Cambodia now reaches fewer citizens. In 1996, maternal mortality was 580/100,000, roughly a third of which were attributed to complications of abortions, which are illegal in Burma, but widely used for family planning, since only 16% of women, according to UNFPA, have any access to family planning services.

According to Myanmar Health Facts, published by the junta, the annual expenditure on health per person in 1995 was 62 kyats, at actual exchange rates this is about U.S.D. 0.50$, and is among the world's lowest. Haiti, for example, is doing better, as is Ethiopia, at 0.80$ per citizen. Health expenditures under the junta, using their figures, accounted for 0.45% of GDP in 1995, a gross level of under investment in health. Since the economic collapse of the last two years, this figure is likely to be even lower. Life expectancy at birth in 1995 was 59 years, but UNAIDS estimates that this has fallen at least 2 years due to the uncontrolled spread of HIV, and probably reflects only those areas for which health data are available. As is true for many ministries under S.P.D.C., the Health Minister, Maj. Gen. Kit Sein, is a junta member with no medical or health training background.

Infectious diseases remain a serious and markedly under-addressed health problem. Multi-drug resistant malaria appears to be spreading rapidly, due to inadequate control and treatment programs. Donated drug supplies have subsequently appeared for sale in markets, and there are repeated examples of failed distribution programs in essential agents, including childhood vaccines. Polio, leprosy, filariasis, tuberculosis, diarrheal diseases, cholera, and parasites remain poorly controlled, surveyed, and treated. With

higher educated suspended for 8 of the last 10 years under the junta, the corp of health professionals to address these crises is actually shrinking. Donor aid will be difficult to use if in-country partners cannot be educated and trained.

While NGOs in developing countries have played important roles in filling government health program gaps, Burma's NGO's have been unable to do so. Since 1995, staff and members of local NGOs such as the Myanmar Medical Association, Myanmar Red Cross, and Myanmar Maternal Child Welfare Association, have been fired for having any affiliation with the NLD and its member parties. Staff of these organizations have been forced to join the junta's civilian militia organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association or to resign. Thus, these are no longer non-governmental entities, and are viewed with widespread fear and mistrust by the bulk of the Burmese people, severely affecting their ability to implement programs. Donor support to these organizations is proxy support of the junta, not support of independent NGOs, and lends legitimacy to the attempt to further undermine the elected leadership.

HIV/AIDS:

According to an April, 1999 statement by Dr. Peter Piot, executive director of the UNAIDS Programme, "Burma has the second worst AIDS epidemic in Asia." UNAIDS estimated there were at least 440,000 cases of people infected by HIV/AIDS in Myanmar, where intravenous drug use is widespread and there is an active cross-border sex and heroin trading with neighboring Thailand, India, and China. The Myanmar junta, however, claims to have only 21,503 confirmed HIV cases and 2,854 AIDS cases. "The big challenge is the recognition of the problem by the government," said Dr. Piot, addressing a press conference in Bangkok.

The junta continues to deny not only the HIV/AIDS problem, which now affects as many as 1 in 25 Burmese, but also the risk factors for HIV infection and spread. A statement by the junta reported in The Nation (Bangkok, 10 April, 1999) was that "Myanmar has no sex industry." And that ". . . the number of drug users compared to other countries is very much less." In fact, the junta's own National AIDS Program, in collaboration with UNDCP, investigated the prevalence of drug use in a large study in 1995, reported in abstract form to the 11th International Congress on AIDS in Vancouver: prevalence of injecting drug use ranged from 2% of adults to 25% of adults across 36 townships, the highest rate for such drug reported anywhere in the world.

Despite the involvement of numerous UN agencies in the AIDS problem in Burma, including UNFPA, UNICEF, UNDP, and UNDCP, the junta continues to deny what are now widespread and well documented facts. This level of denial is matched by inefficiency. In 1997 less half of the 1.2 million condoms donated to the country by UNICEF were successfully distributed, or roughly 600,000 condoms. In the same year, Thailand, with only a slightly larger population, distributed 60 million free condoms. HIV/AIDS remains out of control in Burma, and the junta has responded thus far with denial, inaction, and inefficiency--a poor prognosis for further donor aid in this arena.

Education:

Burma was once considered one of the most literate countries in the world. Today, however, the education system at all levels in Burma is decaying–and along with it the futures of Burma’s next generations. The authorities have all but stopped funding education in Burma. And so the burden falls on the children and their families. Approximately 40% of children never enter school and of these and only 25-35% will complete the 5 years of primary education. These abysmal enrolment and completion rates are falling, as is the quality of education: "Against [a] backdrop of conflict and economic decline, education standards have plummeted throughout Burma." The military regime spends over 222% more on its army than on health and education services combined.

According to a study conducted by UNICEF and the military authorities, the single greatest obstacle to school attendance in Burma is cost: 57.6% of households cannot afford basic education for their children. A great many students cannot attend school because their parents would be required to pay for school uniforms, textbooks, papers, pens, and contributions to the Parent Teacher Association (PTA) fund, as well as other contributions for school improvement. Access to primary education in Burma is also inappropriately politicized. In many townships, NLD members are prohibited from participating in Parent Teacher Associations. Therefore, aid projects implemented through PTAs invariably exclude-on the basis of extraneous political considerations-the children of families the regime considers to be supporters of the democracy movement.

According to UNICEF and The World Bank, the single highest cost of educating children at all levels is usually uniforms, with "transport and pocket money" being the next highest. Because the cost of education to families is such a significant barrier to attendance and the single greatest cost is school uniforms, one obvious and easily monitored way for to make primary education accessible would be to provide school uniforms directly to families.

 

The Environment:

Until such time as there is a change to a more open and accountable political system in Burma, there is little that environmental and conservation organizations can do effectively inside the country. Following a nearly two year investigation on forest management, World Resources International found that "under the current political circumstances, there is no scope for direct engagement by the international community" and therefore recommended that the international community "should support projects that shed light on what is happening on the ground." This form of engagement would allow NGOs and others in the international community to increase international pressure on the regime to move toward the kind of accountable political system that is the only way to end the unsustainable, and often illegal, logging practices occurring in the border areas.

The NLD has pointed out that projects implemented through the authorities are inevitably done without the consent of those who live on the land. For a project to be effective, it must involve the people who live on the land by educating them and engender their support by making it in their economic interest to conserve the land. The authorities in Burma thus far refuse to allow conservation organizations free access to the people or their habitats most affected.

 

Women and Children:

Burma’s women and children endure some of the worse hardships in the day-to-day struggles of living under a military dictatorship. Women and children often forced to work as military porters under harsh conditions and child soldiers as young as 14 year old are not unusual.

The country’s women, though, face special problems, and especially young ethnic women are often the target of particular abuse. Rape by soldiers is common, and the military has been implicated in the trafficking of Burmese women into prostitution in neighboring Thailand and other neighboring countries. As many as 40,000 Burmese women, most of them from minority ethnic groups, are believed to be employed in Thai brothels. Some are abducted, others lured with false promises of legitimate employment, scarce in their impoverished home areas. Many contract AIDS or other serious diseases. It is certain that the large-scale trafficking of Burmese women, some of whom have been sold into prostitution for as little as $35-40, could not continue without the consent and cooperation of Burmese security forces and their Thai counterparts along Burma’s frontiers.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) recently reported that: "In violation of the absolute prohibition in Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Convention, forced or compulsory labour is widely imposed on women including pregnant women and nursing mothers, children below the age of 18 who may be as young as 12 or 10 years of age and who would otherwise be at school and persons above the age of 45 as well as persons otherwise unfit for work, for portering, messenger service, camp building sweeping roads to detect mines, sentry duty, building roads and railways and other infrastructure works.

The women and children of Burma are largely innocent victims of the disparity in government expenditure on maintaining and increasing its armed forces over health and education services. Burma placed 133rd, just behind the impoverished and resource-poor African states of São Tome and Lesotho among 174 countries rated in UNDP’s Human Development Index for 1997. The regime and government-organized organizations run some child welfare programs, but according to its own statistics, although education is compulsory 65 to 75 percent of children do not finish primary school, and only 5 percent complete secondary school.

Less than 40% of Burmese have access to safe water and sanitation. The few health services available are often rudimentary and have deteriorated seriously over the last decade. Even new foreign investment can create difficulties. For example, many foreign-financed garment factories employ mostly women and children who would not ordinarily be working under such harsh conditions if they were not so desperately poor.

Women are not at all or under-represented in positions of genuine power and governance. Burma ranks lowest among the world’s countries in terms of women’s participation in government. Especially among the dictatorship’s self-selected ranks, women are not represented. The UNDP’s 1997 figures show that Burma joins only ten other countries in the world, including Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the Solomon Islands, in which women hold no significant government posts.

Potential Donor Responsibilities

The National League for Democracy has made clear its position on foreign donor aid in communications with the UN Development Program. Two main principals were put forward: when providing humanitarian aid to Burma, United Nations agencies have an obligation to work in close cooperation or consultation with the elected NLD leadership; and that "aid should be delivered to the right people in the right way."

Consecutive UN General Assembly resolutions recognizing the right of Burma's citizens to participate freely in the political process implies that donor aid should not be provided in such a way as to impede or frustrate this right. And this responsibility of UN agencies not to frustrate the political rights of Burma's people extends to those NGOs selected as grantees to implement UN projects. The difficulty here is that donors are currently strongly discouraged from consultation with the NLD, and that indigenous NGOs have been politicized by the military regime through purges of all members with NLD associations. The regime has thus politicized the humanitarian aid process.

The NLD argues that aid should be extended on the basis of humanitarian, rather than political needs, and not on whether recipients stand in favor with the authorities. This has not been the practice under SPDC. An example of current politicized aid under the regime occurred between December 1998 and January 1999 in Kyaukpadaung Township, Mandalay Division.

The World Health Organization was then funding the provision of free polio vaccines for all of Burma's children. However, personnel of the Ministry of Health were charging 10 kyat per family for the vaccine, and local government authorities forced villagers to purchase the vaccine. As a consequence, approximately 300 children in the area received the dose of oral polio vaccine, while over 500 had received it previously when it was provided without charge, as intended by the donor. (In order to prevent a polio epidemic from breaking out, doctors recommend at least a 90 per cent vaccination coverage rate.) Here donor aid failed to meet its objective (full coverage against polio) and corrupt local officials used the donor-sponsorship as an opportunity to further impoverish local people.

There are many other examples of this kind of programmatic failure under the current regime.

 

Development Policy Failures

The health, vital indicators, educational levels, development status, and human rights situation of the people of Burma have deteriorated over the last eleven years of military rule. This regime’s efforts at development have failed. While the inclination to redress the humanitarian crises created by the regime’s policies with donor aid, such aid channeled into a system that created the crisis is unlikely to solve it. The regime’s development policy failures are many and there is little indication that they are learning from their mistakes.

Among the mistakes made by the authorities is their under-investment in development and excessive spending on the military and police forces. The SPDC reports that 60% of its operating budget goes to the military. The actual level may be higher. Further mistakes include declining expenditures for health care on a per capita basis. In 1995 health care expenditures were 62 kyats/person, among the lowest in the world. Other mistakes are crippling the ability of the economy to provide the kind of growth that would alleviate suffering.

According to a recent report by the United Nation’s Working Group on Burma, the SPDC's efforts to reform the economy do "not have the underpinnings of sustainable long-term growth. The agriculture sector, which accounts for the greatest part of Burma’s economy, is under strict input and out-put price restrictions that have impoverished the 60 per cent of the population who are small farmers. Foreign investment in capital-intensive areas is promoted, but there is little investment in productive and labor-intensive sectors; investment-led growth potential is minimal. Rising budget deficits are causing sharp inflationary pressures.

Corruption, mismanagement, and the expanding narcotics economy pose equally severe threats to the development of a legitimate economy. Opium poppy cultivation, measured in acreage under poppy cultivation, has more than doubled since 1988.

Long-term development goals are also neglected. This best evidenced of which is the closure of the universities for 8 of the last 10 years. Efforts to control political expression and information flows, as well as the inclination of the authorities to cover up serious human emergencies for political reasons prevent the feedback necessary to redress complex emergency situations. For example, information on AIDS epidemiology, natural disasters, forced migration, and refugee repatriation is repressed. Burma has the world’s most severe Internet censorship law and information technology (e-mail and Internet) is restricted to 200 carefully screened licensees. The restrictions are not only legal, but also financial. The costs of 1,000 USD/license, leaves the Internet out of the range of virtually all Burmese civilians.

 

Current Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Burma

A number of international NGO and UN organizations now maintain humanitarian assistance programs in Burma. Their experience provides useful case-studies to assess the impact of aid to relieve the humanitarian crisis.

Among the problems aid providers are encountering are bureaucratic inefficiencies and delays. All NGOs require a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from the respective government ministries to operate in the country. Currently, about one-third of NGOs based in the country are waiting for government permission for their proposed activities. Some have waited over a year for permission to begin activity--others have waited over 15 months only to be denied. Even an MOU does not guarantee NGOs independence in selection of project sites, hiring and other issues related to project implementation and evaluation.

An effect NGOs are at risk of causing is that the provision of can free government resources for other less benevolent uses. In the Burmese context, humanitarian assistance enables the authorities to reallocate budgetary resources in other activities, such as, security and defense. In the presence of constant pressure from the World Bank and IMF to reduce government spending, the infusion of humanitarian assistance may also lead the government to cut already meager spending on social services while maintaining high levels of spending on security and the military.

Another risk entailed by providing humanitarian aid in Burma is that by privileging populations favored by the authorities, NGOs risk funding the regime’s pacification campaigns. Finally, the presence of humanitarian and relief agencies has been used by the junta to counter charges of human rights violations and convey an impression of international legitimacy. Indeed, given the limited scope and lengthy delays encountered by NGOs seeking to operate in Burma, it is plausible that an appearance of legitimacy is the junta's principal reason for allowing NGOs entry at all.

 

 

 

Recommendations for an operational framework for humanitarian aid

  1. The international humanitarian and aid community should develop a strong consensus on assistance to Burma. As a minimum, aid and development programs must be transparent and carefully and independently monitored.
  2. Humanitarian aid providers should be in regular consultation with the National League for Democracy in Rangoon, including the timely provision of such technical assessment reports and other documentation necessary to make consultation meaningful. Ethnic leaders should also be regularly consulted regarding projects in their communities.
  3. In order to address the humanitarian crisis, donors need to recognize, and, where possible, move toward addressing the root causes of the humanitarian crisis--the unresolved political crisis initiated by SLORC's seizure of state power in 1988.

4. Politically-based discrimination against particular categories of recipients (members of NLD and democratic movement in the case of Burma) is a violation of humanitarian principles. Aid tied to excluding elected leaders serves as direct support of the junta.

5. Donor organizations and governments are encouraged to create opportunities for feedback and dialogue on technical policy issues and current practices causing humanitarian hardship.

6. In the severely constrained political environment of 1999, international organizations planning to respond the crises in Burma will likely need to devise innovative relief strategies to meet the dual challenges of humanitarian emergencies and political exigencies. Such ideas might include:

6.1. cross-border assistance programs to expand the existing relief parameters in the border areas;

6.2. an emphasis on capacity-building and training in relief delivery thus strengthening the capability for sustainable self help and long term development;

6.3 advocacy on part of the development community to influence the parties in Burma to end the underlying political stalemate;

6.4 a decision making process that gives a greater role to the people of Burma to participate in the discussions about aid initiatives that affect their lives and determine their futures.

  1. The development of independent religious and community based NGOs in operating humanitarian projects should be a conditionality of aid.
  2. The international community must increase its activities, through the United Nations, ASEAN and with Burma's trading partners to push for a resolution of the political crisis. Without such a resolution, the policies of the current authorities will continue to both cause immense suffering and to prevent its relief.